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51 Introduction
The EUWARENESS project systematically studies the generation and results
of diverse and innovative institutional resource regimes at a (tributary) water
basin scale. The project aims at the key action ‘Sustainable management and
quality of water’, targeted field ‘Integrated management and sustainable use
of water resources at catchment scale: Socio-economic aspects of
sustainable use of water’ of the fifth EU research framework. It investigated
the dynamic relationships between various uses of water resources, the
regimes under which these uses of water resources are managed, and factors
in the political context generating regime shifts.
In this project, a theoretical framework on institutional regime analysis will be
used that combines property rights theory and institutional rational choice with
approaches from political science (policy analysis, in particular policy design
theory), thereby innovating the theory of institutional regime. The study
examines the potential for an increased integration of institutional elements
such as property rights to natural resources and the deliberate combination of
these institutional elements with other resource protection and use policies.
So far, the response to the deterioration in water resource quality arising from
the effects of economic growth has taken the form of environment policy
intervention. However, the capacity for government intervention in this area of
the environment is limited due to the existence of implementation deficits, the
restriction of traditional environmental policy to selective and often individual
and media-oriented emissions management, and the frequent absence of an
integrated management of water resources. We define integrated
management of water resources as a conscious and planned management
which takes into account the joint impacts of all forms of use on a given water
resource. This also applies in cases where individual uses are not actually
excessive.
The EUWARENESS project is build around two research questions. The first
one asks for ‘forms and examples of sustainable water resource regimes and
the way they affect sustainability’ and the second one – which is emphasised
in our research – is about the ‘political conditions that give rise to such
regimes’. Furthermore our initial research proposal made very clear in text,
pictures and hypotheses, that these sustainable water resources regimes
would be expected to be “integrated regimes”, rather than simple ones or
complex ones. Consequently, we decided to concentrate us on explaining
changes of water resource regimes leading towards more integration. This is
related to second question, but involves giving examples of relatively more
integrated regimes (aspect of first question).
About the other aspect of the first question (how do these regimes affect
sustainability) we decided to remain modest, only looking for obvious
implications of the concrete changes in the regimes as observed for the
sustainability of resource use and/or the protection of the ecological functions
of the water resource. In this way we avoid the necessity of working with a
complete and ultimate concept of sustainability. Nevertheless we explicitly
leave the possibility open that the observed forms of more integration do NOT
6lead to more sustainable use. They might affect trivial aspects, be
counteracted by other forces, or even be perverse in themselves.
Part of the research is done by case studies. This report presents the
comparison of the case studies as part of the final report on the Euwareness
project. The case studies consist of a detailed examination of the
development of more integrative regimes. With the help of this information we
will test hypotheses on the generation and effects of such regimes in practice.
The cases were water-basin based and of intermediate scale (mostly tributary
basins). Cases of regimes studied addressed issues of surface water,
groundwater, wetlands or combinations of these.
The remainder of this report has a methodological logic. First the theoretical
backgrounds and the hypotheses for the research are explained and
stipulated in Chapter 2. Next the methodological backgrounds and choices are
made explicit in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the results. In a concluding
Chapter 5 some implications of these results are given. Here we will return to
the starting point in this introductory chapter: what insights could be helpful for
the implementation of the European Water Framework Directive?
72 Integrated regimes and their relevance for sustainable
resource use: Theoretical backgrounds and hypotheses
2.1 Introduction
In this section we do nót aim at presenting the voluminous world literature on
the topic of institutional regime analysis. In appendix 1 some of this literature
is briefly dealt with. Our main purpose here is to present the theoretical
notions that we choose or developed – standing on the shoulders of many
others – and used in this particular research project.
The central question of the EUWARENESS project is: “Which
conditions lead to regime shifts towards sustainable water resource regimes?”
As for the evolution of regimes, our main attention is to the transformation
from complex into more integrated regimes, under the assumption that more
integrated regimes tend to be more sustainable. Thus, an important question
is: ‘What factors cause shifts towards integrated regimes?’  A second related
question to support the above assumption is: ‘Which water resource regimes
are sustainable?’ We will pay some (although less) attention to this question,
as well. Below we will formulate our hypotheses about regime shift towards
integration and about the sustainability implications of institutional resource
regimes.
The framework of the EUWARENESS project interprets “regimes” as
institutional resource regimes, which are made up of a public governance
component and a property rights component.  The combination of those
components determines the sustainability of the given institutional resource
regime.  In turn, these regimes, or rather their property rights and governance
components, are influenced by external change agents, which lead to regime
change.  The following figure illustrates these dynamics.
8External Change Agents Institutional Resource
Regime
General political institutions .
Property rights
General policy process and     1
policy processes other fields
Major societal developments:
- economical
- technological           Elements of
- demographic                public governance
- cultural
- spatial
(Feedback from) problem situation
Readers that have no particular interest in the details of the theories explained
here can skip most of this chapter and jump directly to the concluding section
2.5 were the basic model and hypotheses of the study are listed.
2.2 The public governance and property rights components
The public governance component developed in the theoretical framework
consists of five elements (Bressers & Kuks 2001, 2002).  These five elements
provide answers to the five central questions of governance: Where? Who?
What? How? and With what?  Furthermore, a characteristic feature of modern
‘governance’ systems is that they have many aspects. They are multilevel,
multi-actor, multifaceted, multi-instrumental and multi-resource-based.
The five elements of a governance pattern are:
 (1) Levels and scales of governance
 (2) Actors in the policy network
 (3) Problem perception and objectives
 (4) Strategy and instruments
 (5) Responsibilities and resources for implementation
The assumed relationships between these five elements are based on the
basic principle that the elements of public governance each form the context
of the other elements and that they will tend to adjust to each other.
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9Property rights arrangements are the second important component of an
institutional resource regime.   In order to assess the role of property rights
and especially the implications of property rights arrangements for
sustainability later on, two fundamental propositions need to be accepted.
First, property rights need to be considered as bundles of rights (Barzel 1989).
Rather than viewing property ownership as the ownership of an entire good or
resource, an analysis needs to scrutinise to which attributes of a resource the
“property owner” actually holds rights.  Thus, a land owner might own the right
to use his property for farming or cattle grazing, but nowadays usually does
not own the right to pollute the ground water or any river on or next to his
property with toxic substances.
Secondly, the sustainability of a given distribution of property rights depends
on the de facto property rights of the appropriators from the resource more
than their de jure property rights (Schlager and Ostrom 1998). Thus, an
analysis needs to consider which specific property rights actually can and are
being used, rather than which property rights legally are being held.  Of
course, legal title might give some insight into possible future developments.
At any given point in time, however, the de facto distribution of property rights
is extremely important.
2.3 Change toward integrated resource regimes
Given our assumption that integrated regimes will be more sustainable than
complex ones, the general hypotheses relating to regime change should
reflect the following sub-questions of the main research question on regime
transformation:
 Under which circumstances do regime transformations result in more
complex regimes?
 Under which circumstances do regime transformations result in more
integrated regimes?
 Which circumstances influence the characteristics of the changes that
occur?
Before we turn to these questions, however, let us remind ourselves of the
dynamics of change in and around institutional resource regimes perceived by
our model.
In general, we expect the elements of the public governance model (and the
regime in general, so including property rights) to exert a stabilising influence
on each other.  This stabilising influence occurs through processes of mutual
adaptation of values, cognitions and resources. Thus, while changes in the
elements of the governance pattern can be caused by changes in other
elements, ultimately these changes must have external sources affecting one
or more elements from the outside.  Mutual adaptation mechanisms that
without external ‘disturbances’ have a stabilising influence then become the
mechanisms by which substantial changes in one of the elements are
followed by responding changes in other elements, resulting in complete
regime changes.
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In principle, external change agents can enter the scene through all of the
elements that are discerned in the regime.  There is, however, a difference.
Property rights might be conceived as a bit more stable and less oriented
towards invoking change than the elements of public governance.  That
means that, although property rights may act as a powerful context for
developments in public governance, changing governance patterns is not their
subject per se.  On the other side, interventions from the governance side
often have the specific and deliberate intent to change property rights.
Changes in property rights may develop from three sources: (a) changes in
the general cultural and judicial conceptions of property and its meaning in
terms of specific bundles of rights, stemming from general policy institutions
and policy processes as a context, (b) economic changes, some with
technological, demographic, cultural, or spatial developments as drivers, that
change the value of certain uses and of the resource itself, and (c) specific
and often deliberate influences from the governance pattern on water
resource management to adjust property rights as a means of promoting
policy goals.
External change agents for the governance pattern include changes in
political institutions, in the general policy process or policy processes in
related fields, the spectrum of technological, demographic, and cultural
developments mentioned above, as well as feedback from the actual problem
situation.  As examples, related to the subject of this project, below some
specific and general external sources of change are linked to the five
elements of governance (cf. Bressers & O’Toole, 1995):
Levels and scales of governance
 Rise of the European Union
 Tendency to multi-level governance
Actors in the policy network
 Rise of environmental and nature organisations
 Tendency to multi-actor governance: increased number of actors involved
in relevant networks
Problem perception and objectives
 Rise of environmental degradation information
 Tendency to incorporate multiple perspectives
Strategy and instruments
 Rise of general ideological preference for indirect and procedural
instrumental strategies
 Tendency to incorporate multiple instruments in policy mix
Responsibilities and resources for implementation
 Rise of proportion of (relatively) independent and businesslike organised
implementation organisations, including privatisation of water management
tasks
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 Tendency to rely on more than only judicial resources and to clarify
responsibilities
Let us now turn to the evolution of regimes into complex regimes and
integrated regimes.2
CHANGE TOWARD COMPLEXITY
When we speak of complexity it means that regimes can be characterised by
a multiple format in most of their elements.  A regime becomes more complex
when more layers and scales are involved, more actors are involved, more
perceptions of the problem and accompanying goals are involved, more
instruments are part of the policy mix and more organisations share
responsibilities for implementation.  The most eminent feature is the gradual
increase of the domain of the regime, that is the uses and users regulated by
one or more parts of the regime. We will refer to this crucial variable as the
degree of the regime’s extent. Regimes with an insufficient extent are by
definition weak as guardians of sustainable use, while some relevant parts of
the domain go unregulated.
Complexity as such is thus not wrong.  Most of the time, growing
complexity is an answer to real needs and developments.  As a matter of fact,
societies generally grew into more complexity during most of modern times.
This sector is no exception to that general course of development.  A growing
complexity of its governance can be viewed as a logical adaptation to that.
Many external change agents, like technological developments for instance,
add new scales, new actors, new problem perceptions, new instruments and
new responsibilities to the existing ones.  This leads to the first hypothesis:
1. Most change agents (in the period and context of our cases) will lead to
more differentiation in the regime (resulting in more complex regimes).
CHANGE TOWARD INTEGRATION
While the growth of complexity in water management regimes seems a fairly
straightforward part of a more general development in society, integration as a
development is not.
While the term ‘integration’ is common in most policy papers (e.g.
‘integrated water management’), in this project we choose to use the term
coherence instead. The reason for this is that in most policy papers the term
integration (e.g. in ‘integrated water management’) is used in a sense that
implicitly of explicitly includes an increase of the domain of the regime, the
‘extent’ to all relevant users and uses. Therefor we think that ‘integration’ as it
is used in the policy sphere is a combination of what we call extent and
coherence. For sake of conceptual clarity and the possibility to adapt to the
meaning of the term integration in policy practice, we will further use these
terms when appropriate, and reserve ‘integration’ for the combination of the
two.
                                           
2 The governance concept used in our framework contains the assumption that the various
elements of governance will tend to adapt to each other. So though empirically many
intermediate forms can exist we assume now that the five elements will form patterns in which
they will have more of less similar degrees of complexity and integration.
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We discern three forms of coherence:
(1) the internal coherence of the public governance component of the regime,
(2) the internal coherence of the property rights component of the regime, and
(3) the external coherence between the public governance and property rights
components.
By (full) coherence of the public governance component we mean:
• that levels are more mutually interacting and are aware of their mutual
dependencies,
• that actors belong more to ‘policy communities’ rather than ‘issue
networks’, implying more interaction and consensus orientation,
• that interrelatedness of different aspects of the problem and their
dependencies are recognised and intensely debated and goals are set
accordingly,
• that the policy mix contains instruments that are mutually reinforcing each
others incentives,
• that the implementing organisations share their resources and co-operate
intensively to complement each other.
For EUWARENESS next to these possible forms of coherence in the public
governance system also some extra forms of coherence come in: that of the
internal coherence of the property rights system and the external coherence
between the two systems of the resource regime.
The internal coherence of the property rights system is threatened
when property or use rights are given to actors for uses that decrease the
possibility for uses that were already granted to others. This can have several
backgrounds. Sometimes use rights that were long seen as non-rival and thus
compatible can become rival ones by a drastic increase in use, or by the use
of new techniques. The internal coherence of the property rights system is
thus the degree to which, the interdependencies in the water system and its
management that occur in reality, are reflected within and between the
property and use rights. The essence of this variable is that property and use
rights of the one do not inherently or under the given circumstances make
rival uses affecting the sustainability of the resource unavoidable, without
external intervention.
The two systems of the resource regime lack ‘external’ coherence
when in the first place in case of a wrong match between the actors targeted
by the public governance system and the actors with relevant rights in the
regulative system (property and use rights). In the second place also a
mismatch of the goods and services involved in both systems might lead to a
lack of integration and thus a possible form of change towards more
integration.
As in the research proposal (see section 1), the central assumption is that
coherence will occur when the relevant actors acknowledge that coherence is
necessary to prevent further deterioration of the resource.  That means that
coherence is not a spontaneous development, but has a deliberate character.
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Furthermore, relatively singular (or simple) regimes (one level, one governing
actor, one problem aspect – e.g. a certain use – one instrument, one
implementing agency) will not be in need of coherence.  Only after some
growth into complexity, coherence becomes a relevant concept.  But then, it is
by no means a logical follow up.  Complex but fragmented regimes are
empirically quite common.3  While more complexity is part of a stream of
societal developments, both coherence and fragmentation seem to be
common developments.
Diagram, Regime developments
Coherent
Fragmented
Simple Complex
Single elements Multiple elements
This means that coherence typically stems from discernible change agents
that demand some form of coherence.  An ‘coherence’-agent can, for
instance, consist of the recognition of the interaction between multiple water
uses or of a European Union directive that demands multilevel co-operation in
water resource management planning.  Also, international and inter-local
learning is a possible change agent.  Unlike an increase in complexity, then,
developments in the direction of more coherence need some sort of deliberate
attempt by motivated actors. The above leads to the next hypothesis:
2.  Other external change agents of a specific nature (see above) can
also lead to coherence in one or some elements of the regime, but only
in combination with deliberate attempts of motivated actors (ultimately
resulting in integrated regimes or in ‘failed’ regime shifts with
encapsulated initial changes).
CONDITIONS FOR COHERENCE
Above, we stated that regime changes in the direction of more coherence are
not spontaneous and typically will need deliberate attempts of motivated
actors to occur. This leaves open the question under which conditions such
                                           
3 In fact, – while integration has clear theoretical advantages it comes at a price.  Every form
of integration creates the need for additional interaction and increases at least initially
transaction costs.
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attempts or change agents will be relatively successful.  Knoepfel (1995: 202-
203), for instance, assumes that integration and co-operation between two or
more agencies will work better when these agencies each have less separate
tasks and goals and the agencies are matrix organisations.
We hypothesise the following relationships:
3. Attempts to change regimes into a more coherent status will have
relatively more success when:
 There is already a longer tradition of co-operation in the water
management sector.
 There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side)
effects of non-integrated water management harm sustainability and
that this sooner or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint
problem).
 There is a notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called
‘win-win-situations’ (joint chances).
 There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power
and altering the public governance pattern in his interest when no
solution is reached (credible alternative threat).
 There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for
coherence attempts (institutional interfaces)
Especially the last stimulating condition needs some specification.  With these
institutional interfaces (as opposed to institutional barriers), we mean, for
instance, well functioning free mass media as a pre-requisite for a more
integrated public debate on the various aspects of problem perception.
Likewise, institutional interfaces can be provided by strong representative
organisations that make it possible for large groups to act as a uniform actor
in the policy network.  Similarly, water laws or environment laws that enable
and not effectively prohibit attempts to increase coherence in water resource
management strategies can foster such institutional interfaces.
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS
Naturally, the dimensions of simplicity vs. complexity and coherence vs.
fragmentation are characteristics of the regime that are of a rather general
nature.  Often, ‘the devil is in the details’.  When some actors find the network
closed for them, it is important to learn who they are.  And when new aspects
of the problem gain recognition, it matters whether these are sustainability
related ones or not.  Etceteras.   At a general level, no precise prediction can
be made for these content matters.  However, our proposition of mutual
adaptation of elements of governance leads to the expectation that the
balances in the initially unaffected elements of governance are reflected in the
way in which the bigger or lesser ‘seismic shocks’ caused by the external
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change agents are absorbed in other elements.4  This leads to hypothesis 4
specified below:
4. The more detailed characteristics of regime changes reflect to a large
degree the balances in other elements of the regime that were not
directly influenced by the change agent(s) initially (including property
rights).
Causal explanations are often sought in the form of isolated factors that are
labelled as the ‘causes’. In reality this image of causality often reflects as
much to what array of factors the analyst has been used as being the ‘normal’
status, than that these ‘causes’ really are the complete explanation of what
happens. A simple example may clarify this. When a fire burns a house and
one seeks the cause, one will be looking for sources (e.g. an electricity short
circuit) of fire and exceptional forms of burning material (e.g. a leaking cooking
gas container). That there is loads of inflammable material in a house and
sufficient oxygen will be considered ’normal’ or even not considered at all,
while these factors are of course as essential as the previous ones.
In our cases the ‘extraordinary’ causes and the ‘normal’ conditions, that
together form the ‘causal set’, are not as clear cut as in the example.
Nevertheless also in the cases one might see on the one hand the factors that
set the developments in motion, like national regime developments as
described in the country screenings and natural resource sustainability
problems that become apparent, to name the two most mentioned ones.
While on the other hand similar change agents sometimes set a development
in motion and sometimes they don’t. Compare similar seeds sowed on
different seedbeds. Here the ‘conditions’ enter the picture.
For the EUWARENESS project it is not the most interesting that problem
pressure sets developments in motion, though of course it is mentioned when
this is the case. The relations between national and EU developments and the
developments in the case are interesting because of the relation with the
country screenings and as far as the EU is concerned. But most of all the
question why similar problem pressures all over Europe and similar EU and
even national developments have dissimilar effects on regimes on case level
is interesting. Again: here the ‘conditions’ enter the picture.
2.4 The sustainability of institutional resource regimes
The sustainability of a given institutional resource regime depends on its
property component, the public governance component, and, most
importantly, the interaction between these components.  In the following
discussion, we will therefore first delineate the sustainability implications of
different property arrangements, then turn to the sustainability implications of
                                           
4 This idea stipulates that not only the degree of regime transformation, but also aspects like
the distribution of costs and benefits might be important to explain. For the implications of the
regime for a more sustainable use, these kinds of characteristics may be important too.
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the public governance schema and finally connect the two components. In this
discussion we will not deal with the ‘extent’ aspect again. We see a sufficient
extent of the regime as a pre-condition for a benign effect on the sustainability
of the use, since non regulated uses and users will tend to disrupt the regime
effects on sustainable use.
2.4.1 Sustainability and the property rights component
Two “variables” influence the sustainability implications of the de facto
distribution of different bundles of property rights. These variables are the
extent of collective action problems between the appropriators from the
resource (which influence the probability that they will be able to jointly
manage the resource in a sustainable way), and the economic benefit of an
unsustainable management of the resource vis-à-vis the economic benefit of
its sustainable management.5
The extent of collective action problems between a group of appropriators
depends on numerous factors well documented in the literature on common
pool resources and collective action in general (Ostrom 1998, Sandler 1992).
Among the important factors are the numbers of appropriators, the
homogeneity of their interests, the presence of leadership, the technologies of
appropriation, and, of course, the physical characteristics of the resource. The
degree to which they are supported by the property rights arrangements we
call the ‘internal coherence of the property rights component’
The economic benefit of an unsustainable management of the resource vis-à-
vis the economic benefit of its sustainable management influences the
probability that appropriators will be interested in its sustainable management.
The difference between the two economic outcomes is a function of market
prices6, of resource characteristics in terms of renewal rates, for instance, and
of the discount rate applied by appropriators.  In general, a substantially
higher economic benefit of an unsustainable resource use vis-à-vis the
economic benefit of a sustainable resource use is always likely to be
associated with a less sustainable outcome.
The combination of these two variables has interesting implications for the
sustainability of different distributions of property rights.  If one considers a
case in which the economic benefit of an unsustainable use of a resource is
smaller or relatively equal to the economic benefit of its sustainable use, a
small extent of collective action problems among the appropriators will likely
lead to a more sustainable outcome.  An example of such a case is, for
instance, the use of a fishing pond for fishing.  Here, fewer appropriators,
                                           
5 This argument is based on the assumption that decision-makers behave as homo
oeconomicus.  This is not always the case of course.  Individuals frequently behave in an
environmentally conscious manner, even if it is not in their best economic interest.  This
willingness to behave altruistically, however, tends to diminish when it is associated with
increasing costs (foregone benefit).
6 One of the (indirectly) relevant market prices is the price of money, i.e. the interest rate,
which determines the opportunity costs of foregone economic benefit.
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ceteris paribus, are more likely to be able to agree on sustainable harvesting
rates than a large group of appropriators, which automatically faces higher
transaction costs in terms of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing rules.
If one considers a case in which the economic benefit of an unsustainable use
of a resource is much larger than the economic benefit of its sustainable use,
however, few and small collective action problems are likely to mean that the
unsustainable use is most likely to be achieved.  An illustration of such a case
is, for instance, the existence of the fishing pond in Paris, where a small
number of appropriators probably are going to be much more efficient in
draining the pond and selling it to a developer.  Thus, few and small collective
action problems might actually lead to less sustainable outcomes of specific
distributions of property rights if the unsustainable use of a resource is
economically much more attractive than its sustainable use. Of course this
would be a typical case where some interference from the public governance
component would be important.
Nevertheless a certain degree of coherence of the property rights component
can in many cases be an important asset for a more sustainable resource
use.
2.4.2 Sustainability and the public governance component
On the public governance side of an institutional resource regime, its
sustainability implications depend mainly on three variables; the validity of the
‘policy theory’, the degree and quality of implementation, and the degree of
coherence.
Validity. The optimal mix between the public policy and property rights aspects
of the regime mix could be regarded as an aspect of the validity of the policy
theory (‘policy design’).  The concept of ‘policy theory’ (Hoogerwerf, 1990)
builds on the idea that policy can be regarded as an attempt to attain certain
goals with certain means in a certain time perspective.  A policy builds,
explicitly or implicitly, on sets of assumptions regarding the causal
relationships between variables in the targeted policy field, relationships
between ‘chosen and newly induced causes’ and ‘desired effects’ (sometimes
called final relationships) and relationships between general values and more
specific standards and objectives.  These assumptions can be more or less
valid from the perspective of a certain policy objective.  In the context of the
EUWARENESS project, this includes the perspective of sustainable use.
Furthermore, the aspects of the policy sector that the policy theory should
reckon with include not only the causes, features and effects of the physical
water resource use, but also the pattern of property rights that is connected to
these uses.  To design a policy that improves the use from a sustainability
perspective, the policy has to reckon with what is already there as ‘self-
governing’ capacity and what is lacking.  An additional important aspect is the
instrumental validity of the policy: Are the chosen strategies and instruments
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in principle, when implemented correctly, capable of causing the desired
results?
Implementation. The sets of incentives that are provided by the regime
(including both property rights and public governance) are in many cases not
self-executing. In order to be realised in practice, many need interaction
processes in which they are applied. Often, these processes deal with the
individualisation of general rules and subsidy or charge schemes or the
enforcement of restrictions in resource use that are mandated by such rules or
alternatively by the decisions of owners.  When part of the foreseen incentives
are not implemented or implemented incorrectly (meaning that the form in
which implementation takes place decreases the incentive effect) even
elements of the regime that in principle are complete and valid will prove to be
insufficient to counteract unsustainable practices in resource use (cf. the
‘policy instrumentation theory’, Bressers and Klok 1988, Bressers 2001).
Coherence. In the EUWARENESS project, the most central condition for
regimes to be successful in sustainable resource management is coherence.
Therefore, this variable will be discussed at some length here and is the
central component of four expectations.  While coherence applies to both the
public governance and the property rights components, coherence is likely to
be first and foremost on the public governance side pivotal for sustainable
resource use.7
First, we elaborate what forms the coherence of a governance pattern can
take. When more than one layer of government is dealing with the same water
resource (as is often the case), then coherence means among others that the
activities of these layers of government are recognised as mutually dependent
and influencing each others’ effects.  When more than one actor or target
group is involved in the policy, coherence means that there is a substantial
degree of interaction in the policy network.  When more than one use or user
is causing the unsustainable problem situation, coherence means that the
various resulting objectives are analysed in one framework so that deliberate
choices can be made if and when goals are conflicting.  The same holds for
instrumental strategies that are used to attain the different objectives, as well
as for the different instruments in a mix to attain one of these objectives.  To
conclude, coherence of the organisation of implementation means that
responsibilities and resources of various persons or organisations that are to
contribute to the application of the policy are co-ordinated or these actors
themselves are co-ordinated.
All in all, coherence can take various forms that all can contribute to the
coherence of the public governance as a whole, but not necessarily each
provide decisive contributions to overall coherence on their own.  To be able
to judge what (combination of) aspects of coherence provides the stipulated
condition for a sustainable resource management, it is important to make
clear what is to be expected from coherence.  In our opinion, the principal
                                           
7 Also, ‘sufficient integration’ can be conceived of as an aspect of the validity of the policy
theory as for the design features concerned and as an aspect of implementation as for the
process features concerned. But by doing so its emphasis would be lost.
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benefit of coherence of the public governance component is to prevent
negative side effects from some elements on the positive effects of other
elements on a sustainable resource management and, simultaneously, to
obtain extra opportunities for productive co-operation of various elements of
the regime.8
On the one hand, this means that ‘coherence’ cannot be conceived of as a
single best way of dealing with these interactions.  For that the multiple
possibilities are simply too overwhelming. Various forms of coherence might
provide for various partial solutions to existing problems.  On the other hand, it
is clear that there are even more ways in which lack of coherence can be
detrimental to the regime’s effect on sustainable use.  All in all, we predict that
substantial steps toward more coherence will decrease specific forms of
unsustainable use and that even in cases of a valid policy design and good
implementation certain specified forms of lack of coherence will cause flaws in
the sustainability of resource use.
For an additional impact of better coherence, we need to go back to the
implementation condition.  In a dynamic context and surrounded by
uncertainties regarding the problem and possible solutions, an adaptive and
learning form of policy implementation is important.  Such a policy style
depends on the uneasy combination of both pluralism (e.g. allowing
complexity, openness, differentiation) to give room for challenging stimuli and
on the other side co-ordination (e.g. coherence, consensus seeking devices)
to be able to produce new solutions on the basis of these challenges
(Arentsen, Bressers & O’Toole, 2000).
Cases in which consensus seeking devices are strong, but pluralism is
restricted to ‘insiders’, like the ‘iron triangle’ of agriculture has been for a long
time in many countries, are, however, vulnerable to become too closed for
external stimuli that would provide the system with timely incentives to adapt
and learn.  Cases in which pluralism is strong, but no strong devices press for
a co-ordinated agreement (like in some examples of US environmental policy)
lack the incentives to explore win-win situations or at least profitable trade-
offs.
For our analysis, this means that the role of coherence is connected to the
ability to incorporate complexity in productive collective action.  We assume
that more coherence correlates with less unproductive constellations of goals,
information and power of the actors involved in the implementation process.
                                           
8 As Ligteringen (1996, 1998) has shown, side-effects of policies can actually have a bigger
impact on the attainment of certain environmental goals than the specific policies designed to
influence that aspect of the problem. She states that part of these side effects occur indirectly
trough influencing major societal developments that have a substantial effect on sustainability
themselves. Because of these indirect influences there is a multitude of possible effects of the
various elements of the regime on the sustainability of the resource use. Also it is possible
that the effects of one instrument are counteracted directly or indirectly by the effects of other
regime characteristics.
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With more coherence in the public governance component of the regime, the
goals of the implementers and target groups involved in the implementation
process can be expected to be less likely in discord.  All elements of a more
coherent regime can be assumed to contribute to a lesser degree of
experienced uncertainty, an increase in information exchanges, and a lower
degree of distrust.  Coherence also means that typically there will be less
possibilities for target groups to play implementers off against each other and
more standard operation procedures for the solution of conflict.
This implies that a more coherent public governance component of the regime
can outperform a regime with an equal degree of extent, but being more
fragmented. This is expected to be the case, not only through the direct
effects of more mutually reinforcing and less mutually destructive side effects
on the resource use, but also through indirect effects on the quality of the
implementation process.
2.4.3 Sustainability and the combination of the property rights and public
governance components
Given this understanding of the implications of the property rights and the
public governance components for the sustainability of institutional resource
regimes, we now turn to the implications of public governance intervention in
property rights.  We base this discussion on the notion that (almost any) policy
translates into an intervention and change in de facto private property rights.
The sustainability of an institutional resource regime at any point in time,
therefore, is determined by how policies structure, i.e. create and influence
property arrangements.
To what extent is such public governance intervention in property
arrangements necessary or desirable for the sustainability of an institutional
resource regime?  The answer to this question depends first, of course, on the
potential for sustainability of the given property arrangement as discussed
above in 2.4.1.  In addition, the answer depends on the potential of
governance intervention to improve the sustainability of the given resource
management.
This potential of public governance intervention to lead to an improvement, in
turn, depends on the sustainability potential of the governance pattern
discussed above. Thus, the potential of public governance intervention in
property rights to improve the sustainability of resource use depends on the
validity of the policy theory, the probability of (correct) implementation of the
policy, and sufficient coherence of a given policy.  In general, we can see that
the environmentally desirable degree of public governance intervention is
higher, the higher the governance strategy scores on the three factors.
Combining the property rights side with the public governance side of an
institutional resource regime, then, leads to the following statements:
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1. The greater the validity of the policy theory, the higher the probability of
correct implementation, and the better the coherence, the higher the
environmentally desirable degree of public governance intervention.
2. The higher the economic benefit of an unsustainable resource use vis-
à-vis the economic benefit of a sustainable one, the higher the
environmentally desirable degree of public governance intervention.
3. In the case of a small economic benefit of an unsustainable resource
use vis-à-vis the economic benefit of a sustainable one, large and
numerous collective action problems imply a higher desirability of
public governance intervention.
4. In the case of a large economic benefit of an unsustainable resource
use vis-à-vis the economic benefit of a sustainable one, small and few
collective action problems imply a higher desirability of public
governance intervention.
Please note that although these statements are formulated in terms of higher
desirability of public governance intervention, the opposite cases imply lesser
desirability of public governance intervention and the expectations could just
as well be formulated in that way too.  In other words, this analysis does not
imply that public governance intervention will always have a positive effect on
the sustainability of an institutional resource regime and therefore is always
desirable and necessary.  Indeed, incidents combining a low validity of the
policy theory, incomplete and incorrect implementation, and lacking
coherence are the clearest cases where the opposite is true.
When we speak of the external coherence between the public governance
and the property rights components of the regime we point not only to the
appropriate degree of public governance intervention. Instead we mean also
and foremost the degree to which the right connections are made between the
elements of public governance (e.g. policy instruments) and the relevant
aspects of the property rights arrangements (e.g. whether the right property
right owners are targeted by the policy instruments).
2.5 Conclusion
There are three groups of variables. These are linked by the central
relationships in the research questions.
A. Change agents & conditions 
B. Regime changes 
C. Effects on sustainability aspects
Our hypotheses and expectations are as follows:
Hypotheses on regime change towards integration
1. Most change agents (in the period and context of our cases) will lead to
more differentiation in the regime (resulting in more complex regimes with
a higher degree of extent).
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2. Other external change agents of a specific nature (see above) can also
lead to coherence in or between one or some elements of the regime, but
only in combination with deliberate attempts of motivated actors (ultimately
resulting in coherent regimes or in ‘failed’ regime shifts with encapsulated
initial changes).
3. Attempts to change regimes into a more integrated status will have
relatively more success when:
 There is already a longer tradition of co-operation in the water
management sector.
 There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects
of non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this
sooner or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem).
 There is a notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-
win-situations’ (joint chances).
 There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and
altering the public governance pattern in his interest when no solution
is reached (credible alternative threat).
 There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for
coherence attempts (institutional interfaces)
4. The more detailed characteristics of regime changes reflect to a large
degree the balances in other elements of the regime that were not directly
influenced by the change agent(s) initially (including property rights).
Expectations on the sustainability of institutional resource regimes
5. Regimes with a deficient ‘extent’ will be more likely to lead to degradation
of water resources or inability to protect the ecological functions of the
water resource, than regimes with a larger extent.
6. Regimes with a large ‘extent’, but with low coherence will be more likely to
lead to degradation of water resources or inability to protect the ecological
functions of the water resource, than regimes with a similar extent but a
higher degree of coherence.
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3 In search for integrated management: Methodological
backgrounds
3.1 Introduction
The case studies and case study comparison is not the whole Euwareness
study. Next to the case studies also ‘country screenings’ are made, describing
and assessing policy and property right developments on the national level
over a prolonged period. The methodological remarks below are however
attuned to the case studies and the way the comparison is made in this report.
First the case selection will be dealt with, then the design of the case studies.
After that we will be re-visiting the variables of the theoretical framework
described in the previous chapter to present a further operationalisation. The
chapter will be concluded by some remarks about the way the variables are
assessed by the case study researchers.
3.2 Selection of cases
In the Euwareness project two cases are studied in each of the six
participating countries. In a first period of six months a first set of six cases
(one in each country) was studied. In a next period of six months the second
set of six cases followed.
These were the main criteria for the selection of the case:
- The demarcation of a case should follow the hydrological and geographical
boundaries of a water basin at a regional scale or with a tributary
character.
- We have been looking for cases of rivalry between heterogeneous  /
homogeneous uses / users of the same water resource. We preferred
cases where several rivalries show up to allow intra-case analysis. It was
not necessary that these rivalries are manifest in the whole case area, they
might also be at stake in just a part of the case area.
- There was a preference for cases where not only public ownership but
also private ownership of water resources could be found.
- Cases should be selected on the presence of at least attempts to get
transitions towards more coherence during the last two decades.
The sample of case studies is based on a combination of similarities and
differences. In some respects it seeks similarities (e.g. medium size river
basins) that define boundaries of the research subject. In some respects it
deliberately encompasses different situations (e.g. ‘wet’ cases and ‘dry’
cases). But the most significant decision has to do with how the cases relate
to the main three variable-groups, since these relations influence the
inferences that can be made about the hypotheses that relate these variables
(see 2.5).
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There are various modes of sample selection, depending on the sort of
inferences one wants to make (cf. Patton, 1980). Some modes refer to the
dependent variable, some to the independent variable. Opinions about what is
best differ and in any case there are different pros and cons involved. Most
prefer the dependent variable as a basis for the sample selection. In
EUWARENESS we have not one but two main links in the causal chain (A 
B  C). We have chosen to connect the case selection to the second variable
(dependent in the A B relation, independent in the B  C relation).
On the surface the criterion looks the same as the other (similarity) criteria,
namely that there should be the ex ante impression that a serious attempt to
attain more integration in the regime took place in the proposed case.
Nevertheless this criterion is a combination of an extreme case sampling
strategy and a random variation driven strategy.  It is extreme case sampling
in the sense that it leaves out all possible cases where there is no ex ante
evidence that attempts towards more integration have been made. The
implication of this is that when we don’t find improved factual (‘real’)
integration in our cases, the chances are dim to find it on any large scale
outside of our sample.
It is also a random variation strategy though, since any attempt to attain more
integration surely doesn’t imply the success of it in close observation. On the
contrary, we expect to see anything from major improvements to only
symbolical alterations and everything in between, due to the various
conditions of the case. To re-use a metaphor from above: we confine
ourselves to cases where seeds have been sowed, in the expectation that
these will be shown to bear fruits in very divergent degrees. This gives the
opportunity to make an inventory of change agents observed and test
expectations about beneficial conditions. On a separate case level the
disadvantage is that in case that in practice little or none regime change
towards more integration could be shown, it is not possible to look for
sustainability effects of these non-existent regime changes. Nevertheless on a
comparative level we’ll find some variation in the independent variable, with
the hypothesis to be tested that improved integration will show connections
with some improved aspects of sustainable resource use.
The following cases were selected9:
Belgium
Case 1 - The Vesdre River Basin
The Vesdre is a tributary river in Wallonia. Its basin is 710 km2
and it contains two rivers, de Vesdre (71 km long) and the
Hoëgne (29 km long. It is an independent basin, since all rivers
take their source inside the basin. Next to quality aspects, also
                                           
9 Of course, far more extensive information about these cases is provided in the 12
Euwareness case study reports, which form a separate and essential part of the reporting on
the Euwareness research.
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quantity aspects are relevant in this case. Since it is a ‘wet’
case, here the latter means the risk of flooding.
Case 2 - The Dender River Basin
The Dender is also a tributary river, but now in Flanders. Its
basin is very similar (708 km2) in size. In fact it is larger (1384
km2), but half of it lies in Wallonia. The Dender flows only in its
lower part into the basin. Both flooding and quality aspects are
relevant. There is no drinking water production in the basin.
France
Case 1 - The Audemarois Basin, including the Aa River Basin and the
Audemarois Marsh as its spreading area. The river Aa is 40 km
long and is the main river of the region. The borders of the
Audomarois Regional Park, encompassing some 550 km2, best
define the area. There are various rival uses at stake: agriculture
and market gardening vs. navigation and nature, industrial
pollution and nature and nature protection vs. extraction for
drinking water and industry.
Case 2 - The Sèvre Nantaise River Basin is rather large, 2.493 km2, but
not very densely populated (290.000 in 1999). There are several
smaller rivers in the area, but the Sèvre Nantaise itself is 135 km
long. On its turn it is a tributary river to the Loire. The rivalries
consist of agricultural drainage and irrigation vs. nature
(because of floods and low water periods) and pollution from
different sources and nature.
Italy
Case 1 - The Idro Lake, a natural basin artificially regulated, and the
Chiese River, that is flowing across the regions Trentino and
Lombardia, generating the Idro Lake and finally flowing down the
Sabbia Valley into the River Oglio. The Chiese flows for 148 km.
The whole water basin covers 934 km2. The Idro Lake is a
natural lake, artificially regulated. Its surface is 11 km2; its total
catchment area covers 617 km2. The main rival uses are
agriculture, hydropower, tourism, nature and protection from
floods, soil erosion and land sliding. The rivalry focuses on the
maximum variation of the water level of the lake and a minimal
flow of the river.
Case 2 - The Marecchia-Conca Basin.
Here the main rivalry is between water for drinking (residents,
but also tourists) and irrigation for agriculture. But there are also
some other rivalries and institutional conflicts. The basin covers
1347 km2. The water basin includes the Marecchia cone, the
biggest hydrological sink of the region.
The Netherlands
Case 1 – The IJsselmeer  is a freshwater lake and former Inland Sea in
the heart of the country. It covers about 2000 km2, surrounded
by about 600 km of shore. Rivalries in use concern fishery (a
homogeneous use rivalry), between gas drilling and the
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protection of water quality for nature and drinking water
production, the rather Dutch issue of land reclamation vs. open
water and between nature and recreation.
Case 2 – The Regge River Basin is a tributary river in the Province of
Overijssel, joining the Vecht River, which is flowing at the end
into the IJsselmeer. It is a small rain river with only 20 meters of
height difference in a 900 km2 large basin. The main rivalries are
between protection against flooding (mainly for agriculture) and
nature and landscape and between pollution and nature.
Spain
Case 1 - The Matarraña River Basin, a tributary of the river Ebro located
in the north east of Spain. The Matarraña is a tributary to the
Ebro river and has an extension of 97 km. The basin is 1.727
km2 large. In this case irrigation – using 90% of the available
water flow! – is rivalling uses for population supply, tourism and
environmental protection.
Case 2 - The Mula River Basin, where irrigation by itself is already
pushing to the limits, but also rivals uses for population supply,
tourism and environmental protection. The Mula is a tributary of
the Segura and has an extension of about 25 km. Its basin is
695 km2.
Switzerland
Case 1 - The Maggia Valley, which is a mountain river basin situated in
Ticino, the southern part of Switzerland, south of the Swiss Alps.
The river flows into the Maggiore Lake, a large part of which is
situated on Italian territory. The water basin is about 930 km2
big. Main problems were with hydroelectric production, quarrying
and flood protection, rivalling with uses like recreation drinking
water production and nature and landscape.
Case 2 - Lake Baldegg and Lake Hallwil, where the problems stem from
wastewater from settlements, diffuse pollution by agriculture and
the need to protect the lake shores. The first mentioned lake is 5
km2, mainly supplied by river Ron. From lake Baldegg flows river
Aabach that feeds the second lake of 10 km2. The water basin of
the two lakes is relatively small, some 138 km2.
The 12 cases display a large variety of rivalries that include most of the
common ones in the European Union at this level. They are similar however in
their approximate scales.
3.3 Case study design
In many case studies normally two parts have their place. The first one is a
descriptive one, in which the emphasis lies on the story or stories to be told.
The second one is an analytical one in which the values of the variables are
assessed that play a role in the theory that is used in the intra and/or inter
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case comparisons to build an answer on the research questions of the project
(Dente, Fareri & Ligteringen 1998).
Some of the cases contain more than one more or less independent
development or ‘story’. In these cases there are sub-cases discerned. There
is only one case-story under the following conditions:
- If there is only one (major) or at least only one selected rivalry
- If there is only one line of development or only one aspect with which the
regime has changed
- If the regime changes observed are highly interdependent, and/or
- If the rivalries in the case are highly interdependent
If none of these hold true, we discerned separate subcases when analysing
the variables and hypotheses in chapter 4. A subcase is than a set of
observations for which of the above criteria do hold true10. In many instances
this also meant that not only regimes on the water resource, but also regimes
on land use, nature protection and other natural resources (e.g. fish) were at
stake.
The descriptive part of the case study follows mostly a historical logic. If there
is more than one important story lines or sub-cases, these are dealt with
separately. From the beginning though, the stories are selected ones. Only
those developments that are relevant in the light of the variables and theories
of the project are worth to be elaborated. Though the readability of the case
studies may involve also other considerations, nevertheless it is attempted to
use as much as possible the terms that fit those of the variables or indicators
of them. This makes it easier for the second part of the case study to be linked
with the descriptive part. Since all teams have extensive experience with case
studies as such, the case study protocol used did not further elaborate on the
descriptive part.
The analytical part consists of the assessment of relevant variables
(translating ‘real life’ observations in theoretical language) and the inferences
and conclusions that can be based on these variables and their relationships.
For the case study protocol the identification of the key variables to be
assessed and their indicators was most important. Since subcases are treated
as equal cases in the analysis of the assessments of the relevant variables,
cases that are split into subcases are in a sense over-represented in the data
for the comparative analysis that is presented in chapter 4. Therefore we also
constructed a ‘weighted database’ in which all cases were assigned four units
of research. That means that when a case is not split into 2 or 4 subcases but
analysed as a single case, that case was included fourfold in the ‘weighted
database’. All the analyses presented in chapter were also done with this
‘weighted database’. Commonly the results did not differ, though.
In order to answer the research questions and analyse the hypotheses, all the
case studies have addressed the following items:
                                           
10 Compare a detective story in which more than one murder takes place. If these are
interconnected it makes no sense, when analysing the plot, to discern them into subcases,
but if they are just connected by the fact that they take place in more or less the same period,
they will probably have quite different plots that require separate attention when analysed.
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1. Case demarcation
- general description of the water basin (geographical and hydrological aspects)
- description of water uses involved (goods and services)
2. Regime development during last two decades
- general historical description of regime development
- paying attention to water rights, policy concepts, actors involved, rivalries
3. Identifying transitions towards coherence
- based on previous regime development description
- concluding what transitions are being found: is there more than one sub-case?
4. Detailed analysis (if necessary for each transition / subcase)
- describing what happened and what kind of rivalry/ies has/d been at stake
- analysing what forms of extent and coherence changes can be recognised: extent,
internal coherence public governance, internal coherence property rights, external
coherence between public governance and property rights
- analysing the relation between regime change (coherence) and sustainability; relation
with hypotheses
- analysing the conditions for regime change; relation with hypotheses
5. Conclusions
While in our case studies it was seldom possible to give a complete overall
assessment of the status of the regime (too many aspects would require
attention), it was possible to assess the changes that have occurred in the
research period of the case study.  Do they simply add uses or users to the
domain of the regime (extent), or are they also ‘repairing’ one or more
mismatches (coherence), and if so which ones? Then the choice of ‘issues’ or
‘rivalries’ determines what changes are relevant in the context of the case
story/ies. In our case studies it has proven that there is no escape from more
or less artificial boundaries of the case as studied, boundaries that are set by
the researchers. These boundaries are not only in terms of geographical area
or time period, but also may exclude certain issues. An example of a change
that is not as relevant for the case story is when national law sets general
minimal quality standards when studying a clear mountain river where quality
has never been any problem. Or when an existing but minor issue about water
quality has been deliberately set outside the realm of the case study, while
concentrating the study on other more important rivalries. This happened for
instance with the rivalry between kayakists and fishers in both French cases.
By viewing from the perspective of the rivalries under study it is possible to
assess the impact of the changes on the regime’s status in as far as it is
relevant for the (sub-)case (more or less extent, more or less of various kinds
of coherence).
We’ll now return to an overview of the variables assessed in order to discuss
their operationalisation in the empirical case studies.
3.4 Re-visiting the variables for further operationalisation
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There are three groups of variables. These are linked by the central
relationships in the research questions.
A. Change agents & conditions 
B. Regime changes 
C. Effects on sustainability aspects
‘B. Regime changes’ is the central variable. A should provide explanations for
it. C should show the results of it. Therefore we’ll start with explaining C.
Sustainable use
Though an overall assessment of the sustainability of the regime is for various
reasons hard to give, the assessment whether the concrete regime changes
lead in the direction of more or less sustainability was less hard to give. The
expectation that more integrated regimes will ceteris paribus perform better for
sustainability is part of European and many member states political ideology
on water management. A more theoretical reasoning to base this expectation
on is given in the previous section.
There are many indicators that can genuinely be considered to represent
aspects of sustainability (cf. the ‘good status’ as specified in the EU water
directive – see Appendix 4). It is not the purpose of the EUWARENESS
research to assess the overall sustainability of the resource use. The
approach to deal with this variable (-group) is the following. We start with the
rivalries that are at stake in the case story/ies. In first instance the assessment
of the changes in the sustainability of the resource use is limited to the
natural/environmental indicators that are directly at stake in these rivalries. In
second instance also the social and economical development consequences
of the changes in these indicators and / or the measures taken for this
purpose are taken into account. In last instance also a marginal check is
made whether the observed changes have important side effects on other
natural resource / environmental indicators and whether these have indirect
social and economic consequences in their turn.
Regime changes towards coherence
The central key variable in the EUWARENESS project is: changes of the
regime towards more integration (extent and coherence). This variable is the
dependent variable in our most important research question and the
independent in the other. It consists in first instance of three dimensions:
change, regime and integration. We will deal with these dimensions
successively.
Change
Change is placed at the foreground here, because in the case studies the
transitions (towards more integration) themselves are the focus of attention.
This means that it was not always important to sketch all aspects of the
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regime, but only those that are necessary to understand what the changes
that are studied mean in the context of the rest of the regime.
In many cases the case study will not contain only one story of regime
change, but more than one. This may imply developments that can be seen
as partial integration in only geographical sub-units of the case study territory
or only between certain aspects of the resource use and not between others.
Our proposal was not to submerse these sub-stories and force them into one
over-all case description, but to pay separate attention to them against the
background of descriptions of the more general case situation and
development.
 We expected on beforehand non-trivial changes (even if they involve
changes towards “consensual management” or the like) to often involve some
kind of conflict, struggle or manipulation, with also losers involved. So, though
it is not impossible that changes in problem perceptions (in combination with
the existing ‘regulative system’ of property and use rights) invoke a real
consensus that everybody is better off with more integration, this certainly
needs not to be the case. (It is even likely in such a case that there has been
some previous struggle about the problem perception itself.)
So, all in all: there can be more than one relevant changes described in
the case studies, and even though these changes are heading towards
integration, the change process itself will often involve overt or hidden
conflicts11.
Regime
The resource regime consists of two systems and their mutual relationships:
the regulative system (including property and use rights) and the governance
system (including public policies).
Concerning the regulative system it consists of the property rights (not
only including the property titles, but also management rights and exclusion
rights), use rights and disposal rights (a special kind of use right, but special in
the sense that disposal directly affects water quality and its protection). In the
EUWARENESS research proposals the following property rights were
discerned: property title, exclusion rights, access & use rights, management
decision rights.
Concerning the public governance system we think it is important to
have a broader conception than just public policy.  We use a public
governance model that consists of five dimensions or ‘elements’, with an
extensive list of indicators operationalized with the help of a survey of policy
analysis literature. Together they form a more or less complete picture of the
public governance system.
The coherence of the regime can be distinguished between internal
coherence of the public governance, the internal coherence of the property
rights and the external coherence between the two. For the last two, see
section 2.3.
                                           
11 As could be observed in several of the case studies.
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As for the internal coherence of public governance six forms of coherence
may be distinguished:
a. Coherence of levels and scales of governance
b. Coherence between actors in the policy network
c. Coherence of problem perception and objectives
d. Coherence of strategy and instruments
e. Coherence of responsibilities and resources for implementation
f. Coherence between the two subsystems of the resource regime
We repeat them here in order to link them to the concepts that are used by the
European Union.
This division is supported by the definitions of “integrated water management”
as being adopted by the EU. In that context, an important source for us to
consult might be the new European Water Framework Directive, which is
defining and advocating coherence by:
- Administrative co-ordination at the level of a river basin as a whole (“the
best model for a single system of water management is management by
river basin – the natural and hydrological unit – instead of according to
administrative or political boundaries”). This element is supporting the form
of coherence focusing on levels and scales of governance.
- Involvement of all actors having an interest in water services (“increasing
public participation and balancing interest of various groups”). This
element is supporting the form of coherence focusing on actors in policy
networks.
- Development of a water vision for a river basin (“co-ordination of objectives
– good status for all waters by 2010; the objectives for a river basin must
be set out in a river basin management plan, based on analysis of the river
basin characteristics, a review of the impact of human activity on the status
of waters in the basin, estimation of the effect of existing legislation and
the remaining ‘gap’ to meeting these objectives”). This element is
supporting the form of coherence focusing on problem perception and
objectives.
- Streamlining legislation (“the framework directive will take over operative
provisions of several water directives”) and getting the prices right by full
cost recovery pricing (“to ensure that the price charged to water users
integrates the true costs”). This element is supporting the form of
coherence focusing on strategy and instruments.
- Co-ordination of the application of measures for a river basin (“analysing if
existing legislation solves the problem well and good, and if it does not,
identify why and design whatever additional measures are needed to
satisfy all the objectives established”). This element is supporting the form
of coherence focusing on responsibilities and resources for
implementation.
Integration
The term “integration” is used as a label for the regime changes that might
improve the sustainability record of water resource regimes. The term relates
to the term “integral water management” that is in the core of attention now in
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the European Union and member states water policies and thus to the policy
relevance of the research project.
For EUWARENESS next to these possible forms of integration (extent
and coherence) in the public governance system also an extra focal point
comes in: that of the internal coherence of the property rights system and the
external coherence between the two systems of the resource regime. Such a
possible incoherence is sought in the first place in a wrong match between the
actors targeted by the public governance system and the actors with relevant
rights in the regulative system (property and use rights). In the second place
also a mismatch of the goods and services involved in both systems might
lead to a lack of integration and thus a possible form of change towards more
integration. Though this form of integration is hardly included in ideas about
integrative water management in the EU and its member states, it is a typical
and logical extension of the concept in the context of the EUWARENESS
project, of which the combined attention to both systems of the regime is a
characteristic feature.
Thus, the three main change variables are:
1. Extent
2. Internal coherence
a. within the public governance system
b. within the property rights system
3. External coherence (between a and b)
‘Extent’ reflects the domain of uses and users that are regulated by the
regime. If a certain use of the water resource (e.g. fishing) is not regulated or
considered by any of the regime elements, it does not belong to the extent.
Likewise if only professional fishing is regulated, but not sports fishing, the
sportsmen involved do not belong to the extent.
Change in extent will often mean that more uses and/or users are
incorporated. Typical for many cases is that nature gets recognised as a
use/user and considered in the regime. A larger extent makes the regime
more ‘meaningful’ for the use of the resource. But there is also a danger.
If the incorporation of additional uses/users in the regime takes place by new
separate property rights and/or public governance aspects, this might lead to
a decline of the coherence of the regime. In this way simple regimes evolve
into complex ones. Therefore in we have also spoken of ‘complexity’ and
‘fragmentation’ in relation with this variable.
‘Coherence’ is the degree of ‘fit’ of the property rights, of the public
governance elements and of their combination. When the European Union
speaks of ‘integral water management’, it means - in our terms - a
combination of an increased extent and more coherence in the elements of
public governance. In the EUWARENESS project we are however also
interested in the coherence of the property rights (2b) and in the coherence
between public governance and property rights (3).
An example of a misfit in the elements of public governance is when a new
problem perspective is accepted, but no new targets are formulated for that
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newly recognised problem or it is not recognised that the new targets are
contradictory to the existing ones12. It would thereby create the risk that ‘the
left hand is undoing what the right hand is doing’. These are examples of a
mismatch within an element. When the new objective is not followed by
instruments to attain it, that is a mismatch between elements of governance.
An example of a misfit in the property rights system is when new users are
granted use rights without recognising that this may harm existing use
rights13, for instance when water scooters are allowed in a lake where a sports
fishing association holds an exclusive fishing right. An example of lack of
coherence between property rights and public governance occurs when policy
instruments address other actors than the ones that hold relevant use rights.
Change agents and conditions
The second question of the EUWARENESS project asks for the change
agents and conditions for change. We elaborated that in three directions: the
change agents, the conditions for successful changes and the more detailed
form of the changes.
The general idea is that regime changes in many cases are the result
of processes not intending to produce a change in water management, or to
do so, but in many cases for other reasons than water management purposes
(alone). The interactions of actors with their resources and within an
institutional context produce the initial change. Behind these dynamics often
more external change agents can be recognised which in their turn affect
motives and resources of the actors involved. In the project proposal
recognition of developments in the problem situation was mentioned as such
a factor. We listed also some other ‘major societal developments’ as
candidates when one asks oneself the question “why was this process
triggered there and then?” Since many of these circumstances could trigger
processes of changes affecting (ultimately) the water management regime, we
don’t want to include only these in the comparative analysis.
For the specific kind of changes that can be labelled ‘moves towards
more coherence’, the expectation is that these changes will not occur unless
there is some deliberate attempt by motivated actors towards coherence.
Examples from the French cases are the Regional Park in the Audomarois
case and a regional State administration SREA, in the Sèvre Nantaise case.
The reason is that real coherence implies not only a reshuffle of power
etceteras (that can be produced also at random by various external
developments) but precisely that this reshuffle is NOT at random, but leads to
the (in a world of randomised pressures) unlikely effect of more coherence. In
our perspective coherence will often meet resistance, like any other major
change in relationships. So, next to ‘losers’, probably also ‘proponents’ should
                                           
12 In the Audomarais case nature protection was added, while the groundwater extraction did
only reckon with industrial use and drinking water production and resources for that, but not
with the needs of the natural area.
13 In the Audomarais case the water level in the canal was raised by the State company
holding the management rights to allow for bigger boats, but without reckoning the rights of
the users of the water for market gardening.
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be identifiable (hypothesis 2). Otherwise changes will lead more often to only
an increased extent and thus increased complexity (hypothesis 1).
The second thing that we want to test in the EUWARENESS project is
whether attempts to integrate need the same sort of favourable preconditions
as some other forms of co-ordinated collective action. We stipulated five of
these in hypothesis 3 (by the way: a process goal oriented intermediate actor
is regarded here as a form of ‘institutional interface’). In the comparative
analysis thereafter we will try to discern patterns that are maybe not
necessary but in any case sufficient to accompany ‘successes’ in regime
change towards more coherence.
The third and last idea that we want to test stems from our scepsis
regarding the nature of many developments that are ‘sold’ as integrated
management. We want everybody to be aware of the possibility that what at
the surface looks as coherence has in fact not much promise for sustainability
in use, since the more detailed form that the changes took, can be even
harmful. Here the division between use-driven changes and protection driven
changes is extremely important. If new aspects of the problem gain
recognition and are included in the weighting of objectives, it matters whether
these are sustainability related ones (often protection driven) or not. The
characteristics of the regime elements not initially affected can encapsulate
the initial changes, even to the extent that these are effectively neutralised:
“plus ça change, plus ça reste la même chose”. This aspect is not so much a
variable than a point of attention.
The operationalisation of the causes for regime change follows the four
hypotheses on regime change. In the diagram below the position of the four
hypotheses is shown.
Change agents 1 Differentiation
(Complex)
Attempts by 2 Coherence
motivated actors
  3   4
Favourable conditions Ex ante details
1 & 2. The first two hypothesis state that normally change agents will lead to
more complexity and that it will need ‘deliberate attempts of motivated actors’
to turn change agents’ influence into a change towards more coherence. The
conclusion whether or not this is true has political relevance. For it would
mean that even when circumstances seems to demand more coherence, by
no means one can trust this to evolve as a sort of automatic adaptation.
Background of this is that real coherence will tend to ‘hurt’ somewhere in the
system. For the case study these hypotheses are relative easy to assess. Is it
true or not that in the case (in fact in each of the ‘story lines’) changes towards
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more coherence always involved some of these ‘attempts by motivated
actors’?
4. The fourth hypothesis demands in the case study attention for not only the
degree of integration, but also the details of its elaboration. The expectation
here is that these details can be understood on the basis of the characteristics
of the regime elements that are not directly affected from the beginning. The
assessment of this hypothesis can only be done on the basis of the historical
descriptions of the changes involved. The number of possible aspects
(details) is simply too big to make a uniform list of indicators for all case
studies. So this expectation is not dealt with in this comparative analysis, but
forms the theoretical background of many of the observations made in the
case studies.
3. The third hypothesis specifies the ‘favourable conditions’ for ‘regime
changes towards more integration’. This hypothesis will be at the heart of the
comparative analysis of the cases. Per case (story line) the degree and form
of integration on the one hand will be linked with the status of the specified
conditions as assessed by the researchers on the other hand.
The indicators for the relevant conditions used are:
3a Tradition of co-operation
- a dominant policy ideology that supports integration
- positive examples of integration known by the actors involved
- mutual respect and trust in ‘fair play’ of the actors involved
3b Joint problem
- knowledge bases in the form of reports and statements by respected sources on resource
deterioration due to fragmentation
- information symmetry between the actors involved on these points
- a sense of responsibility for the future with the actors involved
3c Joint chances
- knowledge bases from respected sources on opportunities stemming from more
integration
- information symmetry between the actors involved on these points
- a sense of respect for each others interests with the actors involved
3d Credible alternative threat
- sufficient imbalance of power favouring a dominant actor (government?) to enable
unilateral action
- information on alternative options to ‘solve’ the problem from the perspective of the
dominant’s actor’s perspective
- alternative option has more severe consequences for the other stakeholders than the
specific form of integration would have
3e Institutional interfaces
(not all indicators below are evenly important to all forms of integration)
- clarity of assigned responsibilities (to prevent territorial battles)
- free and alert mass media to induce awareness of challenges into the system
- legal or practical possibilities to protect negotiated compromises from continuous litigation
- actors, independent or within the administration, with solely process objectives (brokers)
- a small number of stakeholders or a strong representative organisation for the major
groups of stakeholders to enable authoritative small N interaction processes
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- legal leeway for more integrative approaches
- official (not only laws, but also white papers and the like) policy guidelines to achieve
more integration in water management (part of link with country screenings!)
3.5 Case study facts and assessments sheets
As an aid to the comparative analysis, forms were used that the case study
researchers filled in. These “case study facts and assessments sheets” (see
Appendix 2) represent the variables and indicators of the theoretical model.
Their purpose is to summarise the information in a uniform format so that the
case information is comparable along the lines of the theoretical variables and
hypotheses. Per variable the researchers were asked to mention the few most
important facts of their case study (‘key facts’).  The exercises of filling in the
forms proved also very helpful to get grip on the case analysis itself. Also the
assessment of the variables in terms of values or ‘scores’ was this way not (as
often in case study comparisons) done implicitly by the maker of the
comparison, but put deliberately in the hands of the researchers themselves.
The advantage is that the assessments are made by people that have
extensive knowledge about the cases at hand, often more than described in
the reports. The possible disadvantage is that different researchers could
interpret the items each a little differently. We tried to counter this possible
disadvantage by providing the researchers with two ‘pilot’ completed ‘case
study facts and assessments sheets’ as examples, namely on the two Italian
case studies. Also we presented an additional explanatory paper.
Still sometimes, after the receipt of the filled-in electronic forms from
the case study researchers, the makers of the comparative analysis had some
doubt whether a variable was interpreted precisely correct (always partly on
the basis of the key facts presented by the case researchers themselves).
These hesitations were then communicated with the case researchers.
Sometimes this resulted in changes in the assessments. Many times however
a further clarification and underpinning by additional ‘key facts’ could be given
as an adequate response.
As said, apart from the few short statements per variable (‘key facts’), the
researchers were asked to use a five-point scale to score the variables in
order to make the cases comparable. Of course the score is not a fact, but a
judgement, much like marks are with school test papers. Therefor we also
wanted to know also the most relevant facts they observed that they had in
mind while scoring (‘key facts’). While it might give a case study researcher an
uncomfortable feeling to transform observations into scores, in fact it gave
them the case study researchers an influence on the way the case study
comparison is made. For when comparing cases one makes always, explicitly
or implicitly, these kinds of judgements on the rating of variables. We choose
to do so explicitly.
In this way, we try to combine the better of two worlds: the depth of
information realised in extensive case studies and the clarity and overview of
a data-matrix enabling all kinds of comparative analysis (cf. Patton 1980).
Compared with the direct, qualitative comparison of the case studies as
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reported, the risk is diminished of the bias that the comparative analyst is
mislead by surprising, but anecdotal evidence of only one or two cases that is
not representative for the relationships in the whole sample of cases. On the
other hand one might question whether the case study researchers are not
tempted to ‘fix’ the case by assessing the variables not really independently
from each other but having the scores on dependent variables influenced by
their assessment of independent variables or vice versa. Luckily we were able
to test this possible form of bias. In the theory both the forces of the change
agents and the conditions for change explain regime change. The latter are
the less ‘visible’ elements of the causal set. In the case study reports far more
attention is paid to the various change agents that to the conditions. This is
even often a large part of the story in the reports. If the suspected form of bias
would be real, than one could expect the degree of regime change variables
and the force of change agents variable to be scored by the researchers in
such a way that they would correlate strongly. But the opposite is true: the
force of change agents is by far not a correlated with regime changes than the
conditions prove to be (see section 4.4). This attests that the researchers
assessed the variables independently at their own merits.
All scores are from 0 to 4. In general 0 indicates that regime changes,
sustainability changes and change agents are absent or even negative, and
that conditions for regime change towards more coherence are unfavourable.
Of course 4 indicates the positive other extreme: much more integrated
regimes, much more sustainable resource use, forceful change agents in the
‘good’ direction and very favourable circumstances.
The more precise meaning of the scores was explained per variable as help
for the case study researchers. We will present the same operationalisations
as in these explanatory notes to the researchers and in the ‘facts and
assessments sheets’, when we present the results of the comparative
analysis in the next chapter.
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4     Integrated water management in practice: Results
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter the results of the comparative analysis will be presented. This
analysis is based on the categorisation of their cases (including subcases) by
the researchers on the different dimensions (theoretical variables). The 24
(sub)cases and 13 assessments (categorisations along the lines of different
variables) per case are of course too many to be handled in a purely
qualitative way. Therefore we present most of the description and analysis
below by using descriptive and analytical statistics that are apt for ordinal level
variables.
4.2 Regime changes
What interests us here is the degree to which the listed aspects of the regime,
separately and as a set, moved in the direction of more integration (extent and
coherence).
Extent:
This is the degree of completeness of the domain of the regime in terms of
relevant uses and users14. While the description of the variable is static, in this
study the regime change is crucial, therefor the values are phrased in terms of
change, also with the other regimes aspects.
Meaning of the values:
0 the extent has not changed while incomplete or has even decreased
1 the extent has only increased on minor aspects
2 the extent has increased on only a few of the important aspects or only
somewhat on more of the important aspects
3 the extent has considerably increased on many important aspects
4 the extent has been completed or was already complete
                                           
14 Almost always the introduction or the increase in valuation of the protection of environment
and nature are part or even the core of the extent changes. Sometimes new human uses like
tourism are the extra issues that are taken into account. Where ecological values were
already incorporated new issues might arise and be incorporated, like diffuse agricultural
pollution.
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Std. Dev = ,93  
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In most of the cases and subcases in the study the extent of the water
resources regime changed positively, in many cases even to include more or
less completely all relevant uses and users.
Internal coherence public governance:
This is the degree to which,
the interdependencies in the water system and its management that occur in
reality,
are reflected within and between the contents of the elements of public
governance15.
Meaning of the values:
0 the internal coherence of public governance has not changed or has
even decreased
1 the internal coherence of public governance has only increased on
minor aspects
2 the internal coherence of public governance has increased on only a
few of the important aspects or only somewhat on more of the
important aspects
3 the internal coherence of public governance has considerably
increased on many of the important aspects
4 the internal coherence of public governance has been completed or
was already complete
                                           
15 The changes in the internal coherence of public governance in most cases included
aspects of all five element of public governance: levels and scales, actors and networks,
perspectives and objectives, strategies and instruments, and responsibilities and resources
for implementation.
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4,03,02,01,0
20
10
0
Std. Dev = ,70  
Mean = 2,7
N = 24,00
The internal coherence of public governance generally increased also, but
less. Almost nowhere a ‘full coherence’ statement could be made and in
several occasions only small improvements occurred.
Internal coherence property rights:
This is the degree to which,
the interdependencies in the water system and its management that occur in
reality,
are reflected within and between the property and use rights.
The essence of this variable is that property and use rights of the one do not
inherently or under the given circumstances make rival uses affecting the
sustainability of the resource unavoidable, without external intervention16.
Meaning of the values:
0 the internal coherence of the property and use rights has not changed or
has even decreased
1 the internal coherence of the property and use rights has only increased
on minor aspects
2 the internal coherence of the property and use rights has increased on
only a few of the important aspects or only somewhat on more of the
important aspects
                                           
14 Here for instance developments were reported like the passing of shares in relevant private
and public companies, privatisation, gradual acceptance of the water body as a common
good, lack of introduction of concession system with new uses, introduction of tradable fishing
rights, multi-level issues like state ownership as a basis to allow new uses (e.g. to issue gas
drilling concessions), while provinces and municipalities hold the public authority to protect
other uses, the redistribution of property and use rights, like disposition rights, the buying of
land by a user or a public authority to solve conflicting property and use rights, expropriation
for similar reasons (rarely and sometimes on the basis of ‘expropriation agreements’, like in
Spain), regulatory unification of the property of land and water, the organisation of users, the
acknowledgement of traditional and ‘de facto’ use rights of some users, agreements (between
fishers and kayakists or irrigators and fishermen) to share water use and the withdrawal of
informal use rights. Generally when absolute limits of the resource are at stake (water, fish)
the property and use rights are more used for self-regulatory regimes, than when the
protection of the quality of the resource (water, landscape, shores) is at stake. For the water
resource in stricter sense this means that predominant protection by property and use rights
occurs more in the ‘dry’ cases, than in the ‘wet’ cases. In ‘wet’ cases often property and use
rights are restricted and must give way to public governance in order to improve the
sustainability of the resource use. At least, this is observed as common practice.
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3 the internal coherence of the property and use rights has considerably
increased on many of the important aspects
4 the internal coherence of the property and use rights has been completed
or was already complete
COPROPRI
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Here the picture is somewhat more differentiated. In two cases no
improvement or even new inconsistencies occurred. But there were also four
cases with a rather complete (change to) coherence in this respect.
External coherence between pr and pg:
This is the degree to which,
the interdependencies in the water system and its management that occur in
reality,
are reflected in the interdependencies between public governance and the
property and use rights17.
Meaning of the values:
0 the external coherence between public governance and the property
and use rights has not changed or has even decreased
1 the external coherence of the property and use rights has only
increased on minor aspects
                                           
17 Here among others the following developments were reported: expired use rights were
gradually transferred to other (public or semi-public) institutions, the aim of a minimal water
flow is incorporated as a sort of use right for environmental protection, an EU inspired
programme gives compensation to farmers for not exerting their use right to part of their farm
land, some technical measures require new responsibilities and resources for implementation
that demand changes in property rights, adaptation of use rights to public policy aims,
voluntary restrictions of the property right holder accepting public policy aims (one of Belgian
cases), the localisation of drinking water industry is problematic but not really considered as a
question per se, subsidies allow the regional administration to influence nature management
by owners, modification of property rights by creation of zones that are liable to flooding,
concessions given by law to user communities, a policy plan to improve the information for
self-governing user communities by the development of a census to prevent free riders and
by studies, creation of (semi-)public bodies or platforms where practically every user is
represented, policies opening up to take also other users that those with a use right to the
water itself into account (tourists, fishermen, nature), incorporation of relevant use right
holders (farmers, tourists) as targets in public water policy.
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2 the external coherence between public governance and the property
and use rights has increased on only a few of the important aspects or
only somewhat on more of the important aspects
3 the external coherence between public governance and the property
and use rights has considerably increased on many of the important
aspects
4 the external coherence between public governance and the property
and use rights has been completed or was already complete
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The external coherence between public governance and property rights
changed in half or the cases considerably for the better and in the other half
only modestly or less.
Total assessment regime change:
Here the mark is not necessarily the average of the four previous scores. It is
quite possible that the three coherence indicators to a certain degree
compensate each other, so that a decreased coherence in the property rights
sphere is made unimportant since the regime became more public
governance oriented or the other way around.
Meaning of the values:
0 the extent and the coherence of the regime have not changed or have
even decreased
1 the extent and the coherence of the regime have only increased on minor
aspects, or an increased extent has led to less coherence
2 the extent and the coherence of the regime have increased on only a few
of the important aspects or only somewhat on more of the important
aspects, or an increased extent has partially led to less coherence
3 the extent or in any case the coherence of the regime have considerably
increased on many of the important aspects
4 the extent and the coherence of the regime have been completed or was
already complete
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The over-all assessment of the regime change is clearly in most cases that
there were considerable improvements on many of the important aspects.
Nevertheless also seven worse and 3 better situations occurred.
While 7 of the cases were analysed as single cases and the other 5 split into
17 subcases, one might suspect that the subcases are on average more
coherent than the single cases, while each subcase only deals with a part of
what is relevant. So we tested whether such an artificial ‘coherence’-bonus
was indeed observable in the assessments. This was hardly the case. The
assessments of the internal coherence of public governance, the internal
coherence of property rights and the external coherence were almost the
same with the single (un-split) cases as with the subcases in the sample of
2418.
The relationships between the assessments of the various aspects of the
regime change were calculated with Kendall’s Tau b, a correlation coefficient
for ordinal variables.
                                           
18 In two subcases the main issue was the purification of wastewater. Since there is a very
clear and proven technical solution (building and exploiting treatment plants) all kinds of
coherence aspects were hardly problematic when the political will to invest was present.
Though this might be seen as an artefact of splitting the case in subcases, it can also and
probably more rightfully be viewed as a characteristic of situations where a technical solution
is possible (though the siting of these plants often does involve complex interactions). In the
other cases there was a lot more social interaction involved and hence relevance for the
coherence of the regime.
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Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).*. 
The general assessment is as expected positively correlated with all the
four aspects, though public governance and external coherence seem to
have made the strongest difference for the total assessment. Also most
aspects are correlated among each other, the least so with the extent
variable. This makes sense since it is not one of the set of coherence aspects.
Though most of the regime aspects’ assessments are significantly correlated
among each other, the correlations are by no means so strong that it raises
doubt whether the different aspects were assessed independently from each
other.
If one treats the variables for a moment at interval level19 and uses multiple
regression to estimate the relative contribution to the overall assessment of
the four aspects, the regression formula “explains” three quarters of the
general assessment of regime change and is statistically significant (adjusted
R2 of .767 with significance p = .000). The Beta coefficients of public
governance and external coherence are significant. They are .417 and .457
                                           
19 Most analyses are done with ordinal level statistics. The use of some ratio scale statistics
with this kind of data has been debated among statisticians. Puritans claim that it is an over-
use of the data, while many others claim that in general the incurred bias from that is very
small and that it is no problem as long as one handles those statistics with care. Our position
is what we regard as a 'common sense' one. What is important are the two assumptions for
ratio level data: first that there is a zero point among the values (which there is) and secondly
that the steps between the values are more or less equal. The latter assumption can of
course not be proven with these verbally phrased values. But on the other hand we phrased
the formulation of the values carefully in such a way that in any case there is not a clear
UNequality, e.g. a small improvement from 1 to 2, a giant leap from 2 to 3 and a small
improvement again from 3 to 4. To treat these data at a ratio level is about as (un)justified as
computing averages etceteras on the basis of students school marks. All in all we rely
predominantly on ordinal level analysis. But for multivariate analysis we decided not the loose
information by creating dichotomic 'dummy' variables (which is a rather common practice in
those cases), but to use the full data as they are. This keeps all the information in and will
create only limited bias.
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respectively. The extent (.100) and internal coherence of property rights (.072)
are statistically not significant and their removal even slightly increases the
adjusted R2 (to .782) with Beta’s for the remaining factors of .492 and .511
respectively.
Since subcases are treated as equal cases in this analysis, cases that are
split into subcases are in a sense over-represented in the data. Therefore we
also constructed a ‘weighted database’ in which all cases were assigned four
units of research. That means that when a case is not split into 2 or 4
subcases but analysed as a single case, that case was included fourfold in the
‘weighted database’. All the analysis presented in this chapter are also done
with this weighted database. Only when there are important deviations from
the original results these will be reported. Generally this is however not the
case and are the results on the basis of the weighted database very similar to
the original results.
Compared to the analyses above only the relation between the regime
change and the internal coherence of property rights is weaker (.243 in stead
of .498). With the regressions the differences are very marginal.
The conclusion on regime change is that in this study in most cases
considerable improvements were signalled. But there were also several
occasions of more or less failed attempts to regime change. Remember
that such attempts were one of the selection criteria for the case selection.
4.3 Implications of regime changes for sustainable use
The over all sustainability of the resource use was beyond our capacity as
social scientists to judge. Furthermore we were especially interested in the
effects of the observed regime changes. This starting point is also part of the
solution to the first problem. So the assessment was concentrated on the
implications of the observed regime changes for indicators that are relevant
for sustainability. That is also the reason that the variable is called that way.
Developments in sustainability of use that have clearly nothing to do with the
observed regime changes, but for instance with climate change or fast
economic development are excluded from the judgement.
Further is the weighting between the environment, natural resource
protection & risk avoidance on the one hand and the economic and social
implications of these ecological changes and / or the measures taken to
achieve them on the other hand a hard nut to crack. We weren’t inclined to
judge in favour of an increased sustainability without some ecological
improvements20, even though economic or social indicators might have
improved21. Here we also paid attention to the relevant EU ‘good status’
indicators (see Appendix 4).
                                           
20 Naturally the reported ecological improvements reflect the rivalries mentioned (see section
3.2).
21 Often the picture for the economic consequences is somewhat mixed. As negative
economic consequences the financial costs and/or restrictions for the sectors involved
(agriculture, fishery, resource extraction or industry) and in some cases higher water prices
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Meaning of the values:
0 the sustainability of the regime has not changed or has even decreased
due to regime changes
1 the sustainability of the regime has only increased on minor aspects due to
regime changes
2 the sustainability of the regime has increased on only a few of the
important aspects or only somewhat on more of the important aspects due
to regime changes
3 the sustainability of the regime has considerably increased on many of the
important aspects due to regime changes
4 the sustainability of the regime has been completed or was already
complete
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Our expectations (expectations 5 and 6) regarding the relation between the
regime (change) and the sustainability of institutional resource regimes were:
- Regimes with a deficient ‘extent’ will be more likely to lead to degradation
of water resources or inability to protect the ecological functions of the
water resource, than regimes with a larger extent.
- Regimes with a large ‘extent’, but with low coherence will be more likely to
lead to degradation of water resources or inability to protect the ecological
functions of the water resource, than regimes with a similar extent but a
higher degree of coherence.
                                                                                                                            
are mentioned. On the positive side the following economic phenomena were also often
mentioned: gains for tourism, avoidance of future costs, job creation and job safeguarding,
and an improved natural resource basis for further economic development. Sometimes also
lower water costs and an increase in productivity was reported. While the economic
consequences were mixed, the social consequences were often very positive and
remarkably varied. As the only negative social consequences were mentioned a limitation of
land ownership rights and a negative impact on the landscape, both mentioned once. On the
contrary the positive social consequences include: modernisation of agriculture, development
of new associations of people, more open public debates and more information for the people
in general, better feeling of safety, stop to decline of population and maintenance of young
population, fairer distribution between upper and lower communities, resolution of conflict in
the local area, improved living conditions, and the reinforcement of the qualities of the river as
a key element of social identity.
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The relation between the extent and the sustainability estimates is rather
weak and hardly significant (Kendall’s Tau b is 0,297 with one-tailed sign. p
= 0,051 and Spearman 0,342 with sign. p = 0,051).
A possibility could be that the relation between extent and sustainability
becomes apparent when aspects of coherence are kept constant. When we
control for regime change in general the partial correlation is however still
weak (.249 with p = .126). Controlling for the three separate coherence
aspects together gives about the same result (.176 with p= .223)
The cross tab is:
SUSTAINA * EXTENT Crosstabulation
Count
1 1
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The relation between the general assessment of regime change and the
assessment of sustainability is however much stronger (Kendall’s Tau b is
.459 with sign. .005 and Spearman .533 with sign. p = .004).
SUSTAINA * REGCHANG Crosstabulation
Count
1 1
1 1 1 3
2 2 1 5
1 1
1 11 1 13
1 1
2 1 4 14 1 2 24
,0
1,0
2,0
2,5
3,0
4,0
SUSTAINA
Total
1,0 1,5 2,0 3,0 3,5 4,0
REGCHANG
Total
In a scatterplot this is made visual. Remember that several (sub) cases share
their values in this plot. This is made visible by the size of the dots.
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The relationships between the sustainability assessments in our (sub) cases
and the three separate aspects of coherence is as follows:
Kendall’s Tau b Coefficient Sign.
Sustainability with Coherence public governance 0,635 0,000
Coherence property rights 0,457 0,005
External coherence both 0,326 0,035
Spearman correlation Coefficient Sign.
Sustainability with Coherence public governance 0,686 0,000
Coherence property rights 0,527 0,004
External coherence both 0,380 0,034
To summarise these results in a figure:
Extent                   .297
Public governance
                            .635               Sustainable
                                                  use
Property rights     .457
External coherence       .326
REGCHANG
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If one treats the variables for a moment at interval level and uses multiple
regression to estimate the relative contribution of the various forms of regime
changes on the improvement of the sustainability of the use, than the
following picture emerges. Thought the ‘general assessment of regime
change’ was included in the list of independent factors, it was quickly removed
in a backward regression. The best fit (R2 .63, adjusted R2 .58) was a model
that includes the extent, the coherence of public governance and the
coherence of property rights. Also the external coherence was left out of this
equation. By far the most important factor was the coherence of public
governance. A model with just that factor has a slightly lower R2 of .59, but
also an adjusted R2 of .58.
When we analyse the ‘weighted database’ the results are more or less similar.
Here the differences between the various models of explanation are however
very small. A model with all four aspects included has R2 .65, adjusted R2 .61.
When excluding ‘extent’ the remaining three account for R2 .64, adjusted R2
.62. The next exclusion here is the internal coherence of property rights. Only
the coherence public governance and the external coherence also account for
R2 .64, adjusted R2 .62. Again the most important factor was the coherence of
public governance. A model with just that factor has a slightly lower R2 of .62,
but still an adjusted R2 of .61.
A scatterplot illustrates the relation between the coherence of public
governance and the assessment of the sustainability of the water resources
regime.
The conclusion is here that there is only weak support for our first
expectation: that an increased extent contributes as such to a more
sustainable resource use. The support for the second expectation, that
increased coherence contributes to a more sustainable resource use, is
much stronger.
To this conclusion some warnings should be added. Indeed, in our cases, a
higher degree of sustainable use is correlated with a more integrated regime
at the water basin level, just like expected by both the Euwareness theory and
the ‘practical policy theory’ underlying the WFD. But, it should be considered
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that this isn’t a sort of ‘mechanic’ causal relationship. Under certain
circumstances it can even be envisioned that more integration leads to
deterioration of sustainable use. Also protection of resources could be
realised by granting rights to only a ‘happy few’, harming economic and social
aspects of sustainability. So, it still holds true that ‘the devil is in the details’.
Nevertheless our findings can be regarded as supportive evidence.
4.4 Explaining regime changes by change agents and conditions
Force of change agents:
This is the combined force of the listed change agents as an impetus to set
regime changes in the direction of more integration in motion.
Meaning of the values:
0 There were no new of changed factors setting change in the direction
of more integration in motion or even the contrary, evolving factors that
further blocked such regime change
1 There were only minor or rather weak new of changed factors setting
regime change in the direction of more integration in motion
2 Taken together there was a moderate impetus of the combined new of
changed factors setting regime change in the direction of more
integration in motion
3 Taken together there was a strong impetus of the combined new of
changed factors setting regime change in the direction of more
integration in motion
4 Taken together there was a very strong impetus of the combined new
of changed factors setting regime change in the direction of more
integration in motion
CHAGENTS
4,03,02,01,00,0
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = 1,01  
Mean = 2,7
N = 24,00
The joint force of the identified change agents in the cases is often
considerable. Only in 7 (sub) cases it is assessed as rather weak.
The types of change agents mentioned were EU originated pressures,
national regime developments, problem pressures and various other case
circumstances. In 13 of the 24 cases EU policies were mentioned as
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relevant22. In all but two cases national policy and regime changes were23.
Only in five cases there was not much problem pressure24. In 10 cases
various other circumstances were mentioned25.
Whether or not each of these types of change agents was mentioned
as relevant is mostly not correlated with the general assessment of the force
of change agents. Only the national policy and regime was correlated
significantly with the general assessment (Kendall’s tau .365, p = .028). But
this means only that the two cases were such influence was not reported had
a very low overall force of change agents. Maybe national policy support is a
necessary, though not a sufficient condition.
That the various types of change agents were not correlated with the
general assessment (and neither was how many of the four types were
mentioned) signals that it is not the type of change agents or the presence of
a variety of them that matters. Each change agent can ‘do the job’ of exerting
a major ‘force of change agents’ if it is pressing enough.
Our expectations (expectations 1 and 2) regarding the relation between the
general force of the change agents and regime change were:
- Most change agents (in the period and context of our cases) will lead to
more differentiation in the regime (resulting in more complex regimes with
a higher degree of extent).
- Other external change agents of a specific nature can also lead to
coherence in or between one or some elements of the regime, but only in
combination with deliberate attempts of motivated actors (ultimately
resulting in coherent regimes or in ‘failed’ regime shifts with encapsulated
initial changes).
                                           
22 As such a great variety of EU policies were mentioned as relevant: the standard for minimal
flow of rivers, (national laws that were triggered by) directives on the water basis system, the
1991 waste water treatment directive (5x), phosphate and nitrate standards, fishery policies,
the 1972 wild birds and 1992 habitat directives with their special protected areas (3x), the
1975 drinking water directive (3x) (and the role of the European Court of Justice to force
implementation), the regional development policy with its structural funds (2x). More generally
various EU regulations were used as arguments in the debates, even when not self-enforcing.
23 Apart from various ‘normal’ water (and some nature) policies also some more regime
oriented pressures were mentioned: promoting regime development at the level of the water
basins (3x), laws demanding (land-use) planning (4x), acts that allow the government as
owner of the water to regulate fishing on the basis of considerations of nature protection,
environmental impact assessment, white papers pushing for ‘integral water management’
(3x), federalisation (Belgium), legislation allowing expropriations and indemnities in favour of
flood protection, and the designation of parts of the basin as nature protection area. Note that
several of these are not or might be not independent from the relevant EU policies!
24 With the problems at hand there is a clear division between ‘wet’ cases (the majority) and
‘dry’ cases. In the dry cases increased use by agriculture and tourism are main problem
causes. In the wet cases pollution and the risk of flooding are the most mentioned problems.
For almost all cases the increased value attached to nature and environment considerations
makes these enter the picture as ‘new’ problem pressures.
25 Some examples are: the expiration of concessions for irrigation, changing market
regulations pushing for new economic developments, state withdrawal from participation in
economic developments, expanding land use for building, the break-down of traditional
management regimes, experts providing new information, local and environmental
associations and devoted individuals.
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In the assessments based on our case studies the relationships between the
force of the change agents and the changes in extent and other regime
changes appear as follows:
Kendall’s Tau b Coefficient Sign.
Change agents with Extent .393 .015
Coherence public governance .112 .270
Coherence property rights .067 .349
External coherence both .127 .237
General regime change .171 .168
Spearman’s Rho Coefficient Sign.
Change agents with Extent .446 .015
Coherence public governance .128 .275
Coherence property rights .072 .369
External coherence both .153 .238
General regime change .200 .175
As expected (expectation 1) only the extent seems directly related to the
force of the change agents. For the other relations more is necessary. And
these attempts to attain more coherence are expected to be dependent on
several conditions.
Conditions:
This is the degree to which the listed conditions provide, separately and as a
set, favourable or unfavourable conditions for regime changes in the direction
of more integration (extent and coherence) Please note that the various
conditions mentioned in the fact sheet are abbreviated. They have a more
specific meaning as stipulated earlier in this report. Though still in brief, their
meaning is stated with each condition below. The sub-aspects that are
mentioned for each condition provided further help with the assessment of the
conditions. Unlike the previous variables, these are no change variables, in
which the difference between the initial situation in the case and the ultimate
one is the essence of the variable. Therefore in the values the possibility of
changes during the period is included. Of course it was up to the researcher to
assess whether an improvement during the case period came to late to have
a substantial effect until now (often resulting in a 1) or that its results can be
counted for in the assessment.
Tradition
This is the degree to which there is already a longer tradition of thinking in
terms of co-operation, or such a thinking is build during the case early enough
to influence later stages of the case history.
Meaning of the values:
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0 There was and remained a tradition of thinking opposed to co-operation
1 There was no tradition of thinking in terms of co-operation, or only evolving
at the latest phase of the case history
2 There was some tradition of thinking in terms of co-operation, but only on a
part of the relevant aspects or only with a part of the relevant actors
3 There was some tradition of thinking in terms of co-operation, for most of
the  relevant aspects and most of the relevant actors
4 There was a strong tradition of thinking in terms of co-operation, for most
of the  relevant aspects and most of the relevant actors
TRADITIO
4,03,02,01,00,0
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = ,93  
Mean = 1,8
N = 24,00
Generally the researchers assessed that in their (sub) cases there was not a
very stimulating tradition of earlier co-operation between the actors involved in
the rivalry/ies.
Joint problem
This is the degree to which there is a common understanding that the
counteracting (side) effects of non-integrated water management harm
sustainability and that this sooner or later will have to be stopped anyhow.
Meaning of the values:
0 There was and remained a fundamentally divergent (conflictual)
understanding of the problem
1 There was a fragmented understanding of the problem, or a more common
one evolved only at the latest phase of the case history
2 There was some common understanding of the problem, but only on a part
of the relevant aspects or only with a part of the relevant actors
3 There was some common understanding of the problem, for most of the
relevant aspects and with most of the relevant actors
4 There was a strong common understanding of the problem, for most of the
relevant aspects and with most of the relevant actors
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JOIPROBL
4,03,02,01,00,0
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Std. Dev = ,93  
Mean = 2,2
N = 24,00
Joint problem awareness has been present to some extent in several cases,
though often only on a part of the relevant aspects or only with a part of the
relevant actors.
Joint chance
This is the degree to which there is a notion of possible joint gains from
integration.
Meaning of the values:
0 There was and remained a dominant notion of possible losses from
integration.
1 There was no notion of possible joint gains from integration, or it only
evolved at the latest phase of the case history
2 There was some notion of possible joint gains from integration, but only
on a part of the relevant aspects or only with a part of the relevant
actors
3 There was some notion of possible joint gains from integration, for most
of the relevant aspects and with most of the relevant actors
4 There was a strong notion of possible joint gains from integration, for
most of the relevant aspects and with most of the relevant actors
JOICHANC
4,03,02,01,00,0
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = 1,04  
Mean = 2,0
N = 24,00
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There has been considerable differentiation between the cases in terms of the
degree to which the actors involved saw chances to actually gain together
from solving the rivalry by a more integrated regime. In one case there was
even a sense of joint loss.
Credible threat
This is the degree to which there is a credible threat of a (potentially)
dominant actor to accumulate power and to alter the governance pattern in his
own way and to his own benefit if no solution is reached.
Meaning of the values:
0 There was and remained a credible threat of interventions by a dominant
actor to discourage integration.
1 There was no credible threat of interventions by a dominant actor to solve
the disputes to his own benefit, or it only evolved at the latest phase of the
case history
2 There was some credible threat of interventions by a dominant actor to
solve the disputes to his own benefit, but only on a part of the relevant
aspects
3 There was some credible threat of interventions by a dominant actor to
solve the disputes to his own benefit, for most of the relevant aspects
4 There was a strong credible threat of interventions by a dominant actor to
solve the disputes to his own benefit for most of the relevant aspects
THREAT
4,03,02,01,00,0
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0
Std. Dev = 1,19  
Mean = 1,8
N = 24,00
With this condition too there has been a considerable differentiation among
the cases.
Institutional interfaces
This is the degree to which there are well functioning institutions that provide
fertile ground for integration attempts.
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Meaning of the values:
0 There were and remained strong institutions that frustrated integration
attempts
1 There were no well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for
integration attempts, or it only evolved at the latest phase of the case
history
2 There were some institutions that provide fertile ground for integration
attempts, but only on a part of the relevant aspects or not functioning very
well
3 There were some well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for
integration attempts, for most of the relevant aspects
4 There were strong and well functioning institutions that provide fertile
ground for integration attempts, for most of the relevant aspects and with
most of the relevant actors
INTFACES
4,03,02,01,00,0
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0
Std. Dev = 1,04  
Mean = 2,4
N = 24,00
Generally speaking the condition of institutional interfaces was somewhat
better that most of the other conditions. Nevertheless in many cases these
were only on a part of the relevant aspects or not functioning very well.
Total assessment of conditions
The various conditions provide, separately and as a set, favourable or
unfavourable conditions for regime changes in the direction of more
integration.
Meaning of the values:
0 Taken together the conditions were very unfavourable for regime
changes in the direction of more integration
1 Taken together the conditions were rather unfavourable for regime
changes in the direction of more integration, or somewhat more
favourable ones only evolved at the latest phase of the case history
2 Taken together the conditions were somewhat favourable for regime
changes in the direction of more integration, but only on a part of the
relevant aspects
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3 Taken together the conditions were rather favourable for regime
changes in the direction of more integration, for most of the  relevant
aspects
4 Taken together the conditions were very favourable for regime changes
in the direction of more integration, for most of the relevant aspects and
during most of the period of the case history
CONDITIO
4,03,02,01,0
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Std. Dev = ,77  
Mean = 2,5
N = 24,00
All in all, in many cases the assessments of the conditions for regime change
taken together are regarded as rather favourable. In nine cases the conditions
are viewed less favourably.
The general assessment of the conditions does not necessarily reflect the
average of the separate conditions. It can be that some are dominantly
positive or negative. Therefor it makes sense to see what the relation is
between the assessment of the separate conditions and the over all estimate
of the researchers.
The correlations (Kendall’stau b) of the general assessment of the conditions
and the separate conditions is as follows:
Tradition of co-operation: .365 p=.022
Joint problem awareness: .194 p=.138
Joint chances: .457 p=.005
Credible alternative threat: .148 p=.202
Institutional interfaces: .611 p=.000
This means that especially the awareness of joint chances and good
institutional interfaces – and to a lesser extent an existing tradition of co-
operation were seen as important positive conditions for regime change.
Expectation 3 was that attempts to change regimes into a more integrated
status would have relatively more success when:
 There is already a longer tradition of co-operation in the water
management sector.
 There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects of
non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this sooner
or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem).
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 There is a notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-
win-situations’ (joint chances).
 There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and
altering the public governance pattern in his interest when no solution is
reached (credible alternative threat).
 There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for
coherence attempts (institutional interfaces)
REGCHANG * CONDITIO Crosstabulation
Count
2 2
1 1
3 1 4
3 11 14
1 1
1 1 2
3 6 1 13 1 24
1,0
1,5
2,0
3,0
3,5
4,0
REGCHANG
Total
1,0 2,0 2,5 3,0 4,0
CONDITIO
Total
The cosstab above shows that generally the lower assessments of
conditions correlate with smaller regime changes, as expected in
expectation 3.  The correlation is Kendall’s tau b .633 with p = .000 and
Spearman’s rho .687 with p = .000.
The figure below shows this relationship in a visual way:
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The research expectation suggests possible different effects of different
conditions being more or less favourable. We investigated this by correlation
analysis between all the conditions and all the aspects of regime change.
As usual the correlations by the tau and the rho were very similar, the
Spearman’s rho’s being slightly higher, Therefor we give only the significant
correlations in Kendall’s tau b.
The general assessment of the conditions did not only correlate with the
general regime change, but also with all other aspects of regime change: the
extent (tau .658, p = .000), the internal coherence of public governance (tau
.749, p = .000), the internal coherence of property rights (tau .514, p = .002)
and the external coherence between public governance and property rights
(tau .469, p = .005).
When looking for the different influences that the conditions have for various
aspects of regime change, this picture emerges.
The tradition of co-operation in the water management sector showed only
significant correlations with the internal coherence of public governance (tau
.360, p = .026) and almost with the extent (tau .277, p = .064).
The condition of a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects
of non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this sooner
or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem) did not correlate
significantly with any of the regime indicators. Closest was the correlation with
the internal coherence of public governance (tau .273, p = .067)
The notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-win-
situations’ (joint chances) again correlated with some regime indicators: the
internal coherence of public governance (tau .452, p = .007), the external
coherence between public governance and property rights (tau .531, p = .001)
and with the general regime change (tau .486, p = .003). The fact that the
correlation of the awareness of ‘win-win’ situations is even stronger with the
external coherence between public governance and property rights than with
the general regime change is striking. It might point to an often ‘public-private’
nature of such opportunities.
                                             Extent
                   .658
                          .749            Public governance
Conditions         .514
                                             Property rights
                   .469
                                             External coherence
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The credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and altering the
public governance pattern in his interest when no solution is reached (credible
alternative threat) did not correlate significantly with any of the regime
indicators. It almost significantly correlated with the extent, though: tau .261, p
= .071.
Last but not least, the existence of well functioning institutions that provide
fertile ground for coherence attempts (institutional interfaces) correlates with
the extent (tau .668, p = .000), internal coherence of public governance (tau
.397, p = .014) and with the general regime change (tau .339, p = .027).
The conclusion is that the conditions play an important role in
explaining the regime changes observed in our cases.
Now an additional question is whether our model in which the conditions
modify the influence of the change agents fits. If so, the relation between the
force of the change agents and the regime change indicators should become
stronger when the general conditions are held constant. This proves not to be
the case. In fact they all become even less significant, while sometimes also
becoming negative (insignificant) correlations. This we see as an indication
that the conditions might better be conceptualised as separate causes that
only as modifications of the influence of the ‘change agents’.
When we try to explain the various regime change indicators with several of
the separate conditions and the change agents together, than the following
regressions show the best fit (highest adjusted R2):
The extent is best-explained (R2 .63, adjusted R2 .57) by a formula in which
the change agents, tradition of co-operation, joint chances and institutional
interfaces are included. Of these the institutional interfaces are by far most
important. The weighted database gives very similar results.
The internal coherence of public governance is best-explained (R2 .53,
adjusted R2 .46) by a formula in which the joint chances, alternative threat and
institutional interfaces are included. Of these the alternative threat however
has a negative load, indicating that when one reckons with the other two
variables the threat variable correlates negatively with an increased
coherence.  Without it the adjusted R2 becomes .37.  The influence of the
alternative threat is however almost significant (p = .052). If we take this
serious it could indicate that, given the values of the joint chances and
institutional interfaces, the occurrence of a threat could even harm the
chances for more coherent public governance. The weighted database gives
very similar results. Due to the increased number of cases the alternative
threat is significant when using this database.
The internal coherence of property rights is not explained at all by the
separate change agents and conditions together in the normal database.
When using the weighted database the same factors as with public
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governance account for R2 .26, adjusted R2 .21. Again, threat has a negative
load here. When excluding this variable the two remaining factors account for
R2 .21, adjusted R2 .17.
The external coherence between public governance and property rights is
again best explained (R2 .41, adjusted R2 .35) by a formula in which only the
joint chances and the institutional interfaces are included. When using the
weighted database the conclusion is the same while the variance accounted
for is a little higher: R2 .51, adjusted R2 .48.
The same holds for the general regime change. A formula, in which only the
joint chances and the institutional interfaces are included accounts for R2 .49,
adjusted R2 .44. When using the weighted database the conclusion is the
same while the variance accounted for is a little higher: R2 .54, adjusted R2
.52.
All in all of the separate conditions (and the force of change agents) the
joint chances and the institutional interfaces conditions stand out in the
explanation of regime changes. The ‘general assessment of the
conditions’ alone is about equally fitting the various regimes changes
observed.26
                                           
26 For this comparison the regressions should be and are compared with the squared Pearson
correlations.
63
5 Conclusions and outlook
5.1 Conclusions
The Euwareness research has had some specific characteristics. While we
did not look only from the perspective of immissions or emissions of the
protection of habitats, but took a resource perspective, a greater variation of
uses and users was drawn into the analysis. Also we did not restrict ourselves
to a public policy perspective or a property and use rights perspective, but
combined the two, both theoretically and empirically. In this section we
summarise the conclusions from the analysis in section 4. Some of the
conclusions are illustrated by real life examples from the case studies.
5.1.1 Regime change
In most of the cases and subcases in the study the extent of the water
resources regime changed positively, in many cases even to include more or
less completely all relevant uses and users.
The internal coherence of public governance generally increased also, but
less. Almost nowhere a ‘full coherence’ statement could be made and in
several occasions only small improvements occurred.
Remaining difficulties with non river basin jurisdictions
In France the SAGE process has generated a collective dynamic. Among others the extent of
the regime that was slowly built before, was quickly enlarged. The SAGE process could build
on the gradually increased openness for cooperation that emerged over the last 25 years.
The SAGE procedure has led to awareness of most (and new) stakeholders that they are not
the only one “main” user. But that doesn’t always imply that there is participation from all
actors or this participation is dedicated to reinforcement of collective action, but rather
considered by some powerful users as a way to get information that help them to keep their
power. They proceed actually in behind the scene negotiations. Therefore, often the
participation is only to defend one’s own interests. Some powerful actors, like industrialist,
abstain from further participation once their interests are safeguarded. Mainly because their
management of water and wastewater relies upon technical supports (i.e. when their demand
is satisfied they often don’t see an interest to participate anymore since they cannot really get
more assets).
The main problem remains that there can be lack of coordination or even competition
between state administrations at the regional and departmental levels. There can be
incoherence in rules and public actions when administrations share the same river. In the
case of the Sèvre Nantaise, where the river is the boundary between two Departments, you
can take all the water you want on one side, while it is forbidden on the other side.
Isabelle Verdage, Jean-Marc Dziedzicki & Corinne Larrue, Sèvere Nantaise Euwareness
case study
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With the internal coherence of the property rights the picture is somewhat
more differentiated. In two cases no improvement or even new
inconsistencies occurred. But there were also four cases with a rather
complete (change to) coherence in this respect. Generally when absolute
limits of the resource are at stake (water, fish) the property and use rights are
more used for self-regulatory regimes, than when the protection of the quality
of the resource (water, landscape, shores) is at stake. For the water resource
in stricter sense this means that predominant protection by property and use
rights occurs more in the ‘dry’ cases, than in the ‘wet’ cases. In ‘wet’ cases
often property and use rights are restricted and must give way to public
governance in order to improve the sustainability of the resource use. At least,
this is observed as common practice.
The external coherence between public governance and property rights
changed in half or the cases considerably for the better and in the other half
only modestly or less.
The over-all assessment of the regime change is clearly in most cases that
there were considerable improvements on many of the important aspects.
Nevertheless also seven worse and 3 better situations occurred.
An example of broad improvements
In the Matarranya river process, there are clear signals of regime change, both regarding
extension and coherence of the water regime. The extension of the water uses increases as it
includes irrigation, population supply, cattle rising, nature protection and tourism. Rivalries
between users can be interpreted in territorial terms (intra-basin driven rivalries). There is also
an increase of public governance coherence, as it regards levels and scales, multilevel
interaction and networks. The most relevant event proving the increase of governance
coherence is the Water Agreement reached by the main actors operating at the river basin
level. This agreement is the outcome of a process in which a wide range of actors operating
at different scales of governance interact: the regional government promoters environmental
initiatives; local actors appeal to EU regulation as a legal resource by local actors; the Central
Union of Irrigation Communities is created as a body representing all irrigation communities at
the basin; PLADEMA —an ad hoc local association— aggregates and mobilises actors
against the construction of hydraulic works; the Ebro river basin administration negotiates with
the local irrigation communities; and the Ministry of Environment finances the construction of
lateral pools. These actors, especially those located at the river basin, share a perception of
risk caused by an extreme situation of drought among the basin actors and progressively
adopt a new water culture.
Regarding the internal coherence of property rights, some improvements can be
identified: the Ebro river basin Plan establishes water needs and uses as well as a minimal
ecological flow; some disadjustments between legal aspects and real practices of the CHE
and the Central Users Community increases its level of influence regarding decisions on the
watering out of the Pena dam and the distribution of water; traditional use rights of some
users are respected; and a kind of de facto use rights are given to illegal users of water by the
Irrigation Communities of the basin. After the signature of the Water Agreement, the external
coherence between public governance and property rights improves to a certain extent. All
the main water users have proved to be able to negotiate and reach an agreement based on
a common perception of the river as a key element for the future development of the basin.
Joan Subirats, Nuria Font & Meritxell Costejà – Matarrana River Euwareness case study
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The general assessment of regime change is as expected positively
correlated with all the four aspects, though public governance and external
coherence seem to have made the strongest difference for the total
assessment. Also most aspects are correlated among each other, the least so
with the extent variable. This makes sense since it is not one of the set of
coherence aspects.
In two subcases the main issue was the purification of wastewater. Since
there is a very clear and proven technical solution (building and exploiting
treatment plants) all kinds of coherence aspects were hardly problematic
when the political will to invest was present. Though this might be seen as an
artefact of splitting the case in subcases, it can also and probably more
rightfully be viewed as a characteristic of situations where a technical solution
is possible (though the siting of these plants often does involve complex
interactions). In the other cases there was a lot more social interaction
involved and hence relevance for the coherence of the regime.
The conclusion on regime change is that in this study in most cases
considerable improvements were signalled. But there were also several
occasions of more or less failed attempts to regime change.
5.1.2 Implications of regime changes for sustainable use
Naturally the reported ecological improvements reflect the rivalries mentioned
(see section 3.2 and Appendix 4).
Rivalries and ecology
In the Idro Lake and Chiese River case the problem generates from conflicting interest of the
various users of the lake and the water basin. The conflicts occur between water uses for
agriculture, hydropower production, tourism, ecological balance, and protection from risks
related to flooding, soil erosion, and land sliding. As a response the use of water was
managed not only accounting for water needs, but also for water availability. Environmental
and land conservation was supported by the maintenance of a constant minimal vital flow,
even in summer and controlling the speed of lake depletion. The maximum water-storage
level was reduced to avoid the risk of flooding.
Bruno Dente & Allesandra Goria, Idro lake and Chiese River Euwareness case study
Often the picture for the economic consequences is somewhat mixed. As
negative economic consequences the financial costs and/or restrictions for the
sectors involved (agriculture, fishery, resource extraction or industry) and in
some cases higher water prices are mentioned. On the positive side the
following economic phenomena were also often mentioned: gains for tourism,
avoidance of future costs, job creation and job safeguarding, and an improved
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natural resource basis for further economic development. Sometimes also
lower water costs and an increase in productivity were reported.
Nature reserves
In the Dender basin, the structure of the economy is modifying. The relative importance of
industry and agriculture diminishes as tourism is increasing. In this context changes in the
ownership of land are occurring. In fact, associations for the protection of nature buy land to
the farmers. Their purpose is to develop natural areas, creating ‘green corridors’ throughout
the region. This activity was initiated and is still supported by the Region. The Flemish Region
subsidies the acquisitions. Nature associations negotiate with individual farmers. The farmers
are often aged and then get additional financial resources (to the pension). The two groups of
actors benefit from the subsidies of the Region that still manages the conduct of the policy.
David Aubin & Frédérick Varone, Dender River Basin Euwareness case study
Tourism development in the Vesdre basin
The low quality of the Vesdre creates rivalries. Pollution prejudices the development of
tourism, the only economic reconversion expected for this former industrialised area. At the
same time purification of urban wastewater has come compulsory. The tourist sector and the
water purification sector are mutually supportive. In both cases the European Union plays the
role of institutional interface. At first place it allocates structural funds. The valley of the
Vesdre is classified as an area in economic reconversion. Both tourism development project
and purification plants benefit from the subsidies. At second place, the EU compels the
Member States to purify domestic wastewater. As a consequence, the competence authority,
i.e. the Walloon Region, developed an ambitious catch up policy and raised the necessary
funds. The Vesdre river basin is one of the main recipients. This context should allow a take
off of tourist activities in the valley.
David Aubin & Frédérich Varone, Vesdre River Basin Euwareness case study
While the economic consequences were mixed, the social consequences
were often very positive and remarkably varied. As the only negative social
consequences were mentioned a limitation of land ownership rights and a
negative impact on the landscape, both mentioned once. On the contrary the
positive social consequences include: modernisation of agriculture,
development of new associations of people, more open public debates and
more information for the people in general, better feeling of safety, stop to
decline of population and maintenance of young population, fairer distribution
between upper and lower communities, resolution of conflict in the local area,
improved living conditions, and the reinforcement of the qualities of the river
as a key element of social identity.
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Concertation
In Wallonia, the tributary basin of the Hoëgne-Wayai, hosted a conflict between the fishers
and the local mineral water producer. Fishers were complaining about accidental discharges
of caustic soda that caused fish disease. During the case, the actors exchanged violent
arguments via the press. In order to come out of the conflict, the fishers’ federation proposed
to the mineral water producer to make a river contract. The river contract is a non-binding and
voluntary local concertation mechanism. All the local actors meet and discuss their problems.
A monitoring network is put in place. The rivalry is broadened to the whole range of uses. All
the quality aspects are taken into account. However, every action is done on a voluntary basis
by the concerned actor and at its own expenses. Even if results in terms of water quality are
mitigated, the initial conflict moved into cooperation and then every local water actor adopted
a resource logic.
David Aubin & Frédéric Varone, Vesdre River Basin Euwareness case study
Our expectations (expectations 5 and 6) regarding the relation between the
regime (change) and the sustainability of institutional resource regimes were:
- 5. Regimes with a deficient ‘extent’ will be more likely to lead to
degradation of water resources or inability to protect the ecological
functions of the water resource, than regimes with a larger extent.
- 6. Regimes with a large ‘extent’, but with low coherence will be more likely
to lead to degradation of water resources or inability to protect the
ecological functions of the water resource, than regimes with a similar
extent but a higher degree of coherence.
Indeed, the relation between the extent and the sustainability estimates is
rather weak and hardly significant, if one leaves out the coherence of the
regime aspects. The relation between the general assessment of regime
change and the assessment of sustainability is however much stronger. Of the
separate regime aspects, by far the most important factor was the coherence
of public governance.
Sustainability and regime changes
Regime changes in the case of the Mula river have some positive impacts on sustainability
including the environmental, economic and social dimensions. Regarding the environmental
dimension, energy and water savings are considerable, there is a decrease in water loses,
some measures to avoid the overexploitation of wells and aquifers are adopted, and a
minimal ecological flow is established. Regarding the economic dimension, the price of water
to farmers is lower than it used to be and the productivity of the huerta improves. Finally,
regarding the social dimension, there are some training programs for farmers and an
improvement of life quality. In general terms, the positive impacts on sustainability seem to be
more related to the increase of internal and external coherence rather than to the increase of
extent.
Joan Subirats, Nuria Font, Meritxell Costejà & Anna Rigol – Mula River Euwareness case
study
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The conclusion is here that there is only weak support for our first expectation:
that an increased extent contributes as such to a more sustainable resource
use. The support for the second expectation – that increased coherence
contributes to a more sustainable resource use – is much stronger. Though
this can be regarded as supportive evidence, it should be considered that this
isn’t a sort of ‘mechanic’ causal relationship. It still holds true that ‘the devil is
in the details’ (expectation 4).
Voluntary restriction
The lower part of the Vesdre river basin was regularly under water due to water releases from
the dams of Eupen and the Gileppe. During periods of heavy rainfalls, the dam reservoirs
reached their maximum capacity and it became dangerous to stock more water. People and
communes downstream were complaining. Consultations went on to circumscribe the
problem in the basin despite the lack of regulation. In fact the manager of the dam agreed
with the main user of the reservoir, i.e. the drinking water producer, to constitute a higher
safety margin in case of important rainfalls. The two actors have endorsed the risk of water
shortages in drought periods. The dams do not threaten the downstream part of the basin
anymore. Informal agreements were later extended to other consequences of water releases,
i.e. minimum flows and extraordinary releases for canoeing. Moreover, this kind of agreement
generated an extended mobilisation of all the local actors involved in water quantity
management as the problem of floods remains, but on different patterns.
David Aubin & Frédéric Varone, Vesdre River Basin Euwareness case study
5.1.3 Explaining regime changes by change agents and conditions
The joint force of the identified change agents in the cases is often
considerable. Only in 7 (sub) cases it is assessed as rather weak. The types
of change agents mentioned27 were EU originated pressures, national regime
developments, problem pressures and various other case circumstances. In
13 of the 24 cases EU policies were mentioned as relevant. In all but two
cases national policy and regime changes were. Only in five cases there was
not much problem pressure. In 10 cases various other circumstances were
mentioned.
                                           
27 See notes 22-25 for a summary of the specific change agents reported.
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Example of a set of change agents on case level
Change agents in the case of the Mula River include the leadership of regional government,
which has technical and financial resources and support from other institutions (EU, national
administration) in the elaboration of the Modernisation Plan. Of crucial importance is the
ability of the Irrigation Community to break the Heredamiento monopoly of water distribution.
Problem pressure also becomes an important change agent —drought conditions precipitate
a deep crisis of the traditional structure of the Mula huerta. In addition, policy initiative and
new scientific knowledge about the state of the resource are important variables leading to a
regime change.
Joan Subirats, Nuria Font, Meritxell Costejà & Anna Rigol – Mula River Euwareness case
study
Maybe national policy support is a necessary, though not a sufficient
condition28. The two cases were such influence was not reported had a very
low overall force of change agents. But generally, it is not the type of change
agents or the presence of a variety of them that matters. Each change agent
can ‘do the job’ of exerting a major ‘force of change agents’ if it is pressing
enough.
Our expectations (expectations 1 and 2) regarding the relation between the
general force of the change agents and regime change were:
- 1. Most change agents (in the period and context of our cases) will lead to
more differentiation in the regime (resulting in more complex regimes with
a higher degree of extent).
- 2. Other external change agents of a specific nature can also lead to
coherence in or between one or some elements of the regime, but only in
combination with deliberate attempts of motivated actors (ultimately
resulting in coherent regimes or in ‘failed’ regime shifts with encapsulated
initial changes).
As expected (expectation 1) of the various forms of regime change, only the
extent seems directly related to the force of the change agents. For the other
relations more is necessary. And these attempts to attain more coherence are
expected to be dependent on several conditions.
                                           
28 Often the national government provided crucial resources like formal rules and money.
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Finding political will
In Verviers, drinking water consumption has led to lead-poisoning for more than a century.
Poisoning was due to pipes in lead attacked by naturally acid water. Diverging interests and
the weakness of knowledge around the nature of the contamination explained the status quo.
The dam that provides water to the town has initially been build for industrial uses. The
network has later been extended to private housings and water declared as drinking water
without prior treatment. Acid water was very convenient for the industries because of its
cleaning properties. This position was well reflected in the municipal council. The commune
was the owner of the water distribution service. In 1980, the EU drinking water directive sets
up constraining standards for lead concentration in drinking water. The commune of Verviers
has to adapt but misses both the political will and the financial means. Finally the building of a
treatment plant is taken at charge of the Region and a deviation of the main pipe does not
counteract the interest of the industry. Works begin only when industry has guarantees on the
unchanged properties of its water. The public health problem is taken into account without
inducing any redistribution at the detriment of other water uses, industry in the present case.
David Aubin & Frédérich Varone, Vesdre River Basin Euwareness case study
Bottom up regime changes
Sometimes it was not national regime change influencing the extent of the regime at the case
level, but the other way around. Here are two examples of bottom-up processes and
subsequent "legitimisation" of local developments through national legislation in Switzerland.
"The process of regional regime inventions arising from local problem pressure which
are subsequently supported and thus legitimated by changes in the policy design at federal
level can be observed in both Swiss case studies. In the Seetal valley, the canton of Lucerne
had already issued a notice in 1988 reducing the restrictions on the number of production
animals on farms from four to three livestock units per hectare. Even if this restriction was
never really implemented at regional level, it served as a model for the introduction of the
same restriction into the Federal Law on Water Protection of 1991. In the Maggia valley in the
canton of Ticino, quantitative protection of the water resources dates back to 1976,
anticipating the changes in the federal regime by a wide margin. At the level of the water
basin, protective measures in terms of minimal residual flows were applied in 1982, a full 10
years before the enactment in the Federal Law on Water protection of 1991."
Corine Mauch & Adèle Thorens – Euwareness reports on Swiss case studies
Expectation 3 was that attempts to change regimes into a more integrated
status would have relatively more success when:
 There is already a longer tradition of co-operation in the water
management sector.
 There is a common understanding that the counteracting (side) effects of
non-integrated water management harm sustainability and that this sooner
or later will have to be stopped anyhow (joint problem).
 There is a notion of possible joint gains from coherence, so-called ‘win-
win-situations’ (joint chances).
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 There is a credible threat of a dominant actor accumulating power and
altering the public governance pattern in his interest when no solution is
reached (credible alternative threat).
 There are well functioning institutions that provide fertile ground for
coherence attempts (institutional interfaces)
Generally the researchers assessed that in their (sub) cases there was not a
very stimulating tradition of earlier co-operation between the actors involved in
the rivalry/ies. Joint problem awareness has been present to some extent in
several cases, though often only on a part of the relevant aspects or only with
a part of the relevant actors. There has been considerable differentiation
between the cases in terms of the degree to which the actors involved saw
chances to actually gain together from solving the rivalry by a more integrated
regime. In one case there was even a sense of joint loss. With the condition of
a credible threat of interventions by a dominant actor to solve the disputes to
his own benefit too there has been a considerable differentiation among the
cases. Generally speaking the condition of institutional interfaces was
somewhat better that most of the other conditions. Nevertheless in many
cases these were only on a part of the relevant aspects or not functioning very
well.
All in all, in many cases the assessments of the conditions for regime change
taken together are regarded as rather favourable. In nine cases the conditions
are viewed less favourably. Especially the awareness of joint chances and
good institutional interfaces – and to a lesser extent an existing tradition of co-
operation were seen as important positive conditions for regime change.
Generally the lower assessments of conditions correlate with smaller regime
changes, as expected in expectation 3.
Polders and wateringues versus water floods
All along the river Dender in Flanders, riparian landowners are involved in a particular kind of
public administration, the polders and the wateringues. The polders and wateringues manage
drainage on their territory. They finance their activity with direct taxation. Draining activities
are contradicted with the need to create buffer zones. The competent authority for water
quantity management on the Dender faces frequent floods of rising importance. As the
problem pressure is growing, solutions brought are residual. The weakness is due to an
absence of common concern between the involved users. The water manager has no
possibility to build new sparing basins. It only builds dikes to divert the flood. It is not
confronted to claims from the polders and wateringues that come under flow as a matter of
tradition. More it exists no real mechanism of concertation between the users and no
coordination between the various competent authorities. Mutual information remains weak.
Everyone is only preoccupied by the evacuation of water out of its territory. The problem
should increase without a sustainable response is put in place. The only answer brought
consists in building a huge pump station at the mouth of the Dender.
David Aubin & Frédérick Varone, Dender River Basin Euwareness case study
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Of the separate conditions (and the force of change agents) the joint chances
and the institutional interfaces conditions stand out in the explanation of the
various forms of regime changes. The ‘general assessment of the conditions’
alone is about equally fitting the various regimes changes observed.
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Joint chances and institutional interfaces around the IJsselmeer
Sometimes rival uses can nevertheless be turned into win-win situations. The shores of the
Dutch IJsselmeer (Lake IJssel) have rival uses of among others nature (bird habitat) and
tourism (boating marinas). Of course tourism on the other hand benefits from a beautiful
nature. Seeking the balance between the two uses therefor can be beneficial for both. With a
homogeneous use like IJsselmeer fisheries there is rivalry between the users, but on the
other hand all users have a certain interest in a just distribution of rights, and therefor may
favour a regime that guarantees this while preventing a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This
creates a basis for joint action that can be further exploited by having the right institutional
interfaces in place.
These institutional interfaces can be triggered by European and national measures. In
the IJsselmeer case the national government founded a negotiation platform, a steering
committee on the so-called corner lakes, a producers organisation on fishery, environmental
impact procedures (gas drilling) and land use planning procedures with open participation.
Such institutions catalysed the involvement of users and other citizens (cf. the EU WFD) and
functioned sometimes as ‘policy brokers’ and sometimes as forms of ‘institutional leadership’.
Dave Huitema – IJsselmeer Euwareness case study
5.2 Outlook: our conclusions in the perspective of the WFD
European water policy has developed along two lines – water quality and
emission standards – that reflect different national views. The new water
framework directive (WFD) is an attempt to reconcile the two approaches and
to integrate water quantity aspects (Euwareness report on EU, Aubin &
Varone, 2002, p. 2).  The purpose of the WFD is to reach a good ecological
quality for all waters inside the European Union, at the scale of water basins,
where an authority implements integrated management programmes. The
WFD should guarantee, as for 2015, a ‘good status’ for all ground- and
surface waters, in quality and quantity, according to an eco-centred logic. In
order to reach this goal, it promotes an integrated water management, i.e. a
management that considers all the water aspects and legislation in a single
picture and on a delineated territory, the water basin. The integration of
control and action should occur for quality and quantity aspects, surface and
groundwater, exploitation and preservation, objectives of quality and emission
limit values and water policy vis-à-vis other policies. The WFD sets up
guidelines and leaves an important room for manoeuvre to the Member
States. The guidelines allow an evaluation and a comparison of the efforts
developed by the Member States and their results.’ (Euwareness report on
EU, Aubin & Varone 2002, p. 18).
The main concepts of the Euwareness study are in close relation with the
central themes of the WFD. The ‘good status’ of the WFD is related to the
ultimate dependent variable in the Euwareness research, the degree of
‘sustainable use’, especially to the ecological aspect of sustainable use.
However, already in the 1996 communication leading to the WFD also due
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attention is paid to the ‘evaluation of costs’. This aspect is reflected in the
‘economic consequences’ aspect of sustainable use in the Euwareness
research. We observed that next to costs also other negative, but often also
positive economic consequences could be observed. A third aspect that was
included in the Euwareness research was that of the social consequences.
Here remarkably numerous positive developments were reported from the
case studies. Generally, a higher degree of sustainable use correlated with a
more integrated regime at the water basin level, just like expected by both the
Euwareness theory and the ‘practical policy theory’ underlying the WFD.
Though this can be regarded as supportive evidence, it should be considered
that this isn’t a sort of ‘mechanic’ causal relationship. Under certain
circumstances it can even be envisioned that more integration leads to
deterioration of sustainable use. It still holds true that ‘the devil is in the
details’. Nevertheless, empirically in our 24 cases the relationship
between integrated management and the status of the water resource
shows to correspond with the ideas guiding the WFD.
The main venue by which the WFD seeks to improve the good status of
European waters is by ‘integrated water management at water basin
scale’. In the Euwareness research the cases that are studied are not at the
full water basin scale, but at the lower level of tributary river basins. The
reason for this is that we believe that integration of management is a multi-
level endeavour. At the higher level of international rivers like the Rhine or
even large national rivers like the Loire, circumstances vary to such a degree
that there is not one, but several sets of uses and users and consequently
also multiple resource regimes needed at a sub basin level. This is not to
state that the full water basin should not be in need of a coordinated
management, but only that for impacting many uses and users also sub-
regimes at a tributary river basin level are needed. This idea is in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity that is explicitly endorsed in the WFD. The
Euwareness case studies concentrated on this level (with areas of some 500
to 2500 km2) and found many interesting experiences with (attempts to reach)
more integrated water management. These illustrate the assumption of the
WFD that it is necessary to accept some variation of the institutional
arrangements that are used to promote integrated management. Though the
organisation of management on a sub-basin level is left predominantly
at the discretion of the member states, we think that at least devices for
Europe-wide communication and exchange on experiences with integral
water management on that level could be helpful for the actual practical
implementation of the WFD.  This could be part of ‘joint implementation’
arrangements.
Integrated water management is in the Euwareness research
conceptualised with the help of the concepts of extent and coherence. The
‘extent’ of the regime reflects the elements of integration in the WFD that
stress that all relevant directives and all waters in the area should be
managed in a combined approach. In the Euwareness research we stress the
completeness of the regime to regulate all relevant uses and users. The
elements that stress multi-level (even international if necessary) and multi-
actor (stakeholders and citizens) involvement and the coherent action guided
by management plans are reflected in the concept of ‘coherence’. See in
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section 3.4 of this report, the operationalisation of ‘the coherence of public
governance’ in relationship with elements of the WFD, including the
measures, problem perception and resources for implementation, e.g.
monitoring. As a special feature of the Euwareness research, not only the
coherence of public governance, but also the coherence of the property & use
rights regime and the coherence of the relation between public governance
and property and use rights are included in the assessments. The study
illustrates that these are important aspects of the water management regimes,
especially – but not exclusively – when quantity issues are at stake.
Theoretically it can be expected that inclusion of former socialist economies in
Eastern Europe would increase the variation in the regimes of property and
use rights considerably and would make this issue even more important. In
Switserland public policies that reduce use rights by more than 7% need to
include compensations acknowledging these rights. All aspects of
integrated water management studied seem to make a difference,
though not equally in all cases. The Euwareness project has shown that
special attention for the property and use rights affected and the relation
between those and the public governance measures is a worthwhile
extension of the focus of integrated water management.
The integration between water management and other sector policies is in the
WFD envisioned by the mechanisms embedded in ‘full cost pricing’. In our
cases we did not specifically encounter this subject. Consequently we don’t
have a conclusion on full cost pricing. But, what we did encounter were a
number of cases in which other than direct water issues entered the process
of development of new water regimes. Examples are issues of landscape,
wetlands and fishery, which were entered into the debate by interested actors.
Though ‘full cost pricing’ could be important to send the right price signals to
all actors, there will probably remain various rivalries that need a form of
integrated water management that deliberately tries to bridge externally to
other sector policies to coordinate.
The Euwareness project did spent much effort in getting a better insight in a
variety of change agents and conditions that stimulate more integrated
water management. For we learned that integrated management regimes are
not something that one can ‘proclaim into reality’. Deliberate attempts by
motivated actors are surely needed tot realise it in practice. We won’t repeat
all our conclusions on this subject here, but concentrate on the points where
EU policies come in.
Among the change agents we have seen that in more than half of the
cases EU directives and other policies play an important role. Among
these directives are also some that are not directly ‘water directives’. Another
observation is that often national policies that are mentioned as leading to
regime changes were in their turn triggered or in any case related to EU
directives.
Even more important than the mentioned change agents proved to be
the conditions for change. The European Union can have important – indirect
– effects here too. A first observation is that European policies are often used
in the internal debate at case level as arguments to pursue a certain position.
This holds especially for NGO’s and other actors with little formal power and
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of course when they want to move in the same direction as the mentioned EU
policy involved. Even when these policies are non-obligatory they have in this
way a certain influence. Of course part of this influence is generated by the
prospect that these policy lines will become more compelling after a while. So
for the WFD aim of participation in water management EU policies can
play an important role. Of the several conditions joint chances and
institutional interfaces proved to be the most important. Both can be
seen as venues at which to aim supplementary EU measures in the
context of joint implementation, to stimulate the chances for regime
changes in the direction of integrated water management.
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Appendix 1: “State of the art” statement Euwareness proposal29
In this project a theoretical framework on institutional regime analysis will be
used that combines property rights theory and institutional rational choice with
approaches from political science (policy analysis, in particular policy design
theory), innovating thereby the institutional regime theory.
State of the art: Policy analysis and the policy-design approach
Policy analysis has mainly focused on the (federalist, unitary) implementation
of state measures and the resulting effects. In contrast to these
implementation and evaluation studies, little research has been done in the
area of policy design. No coherent and empirically founded theory has been
developed to explain why a particular instrument was selected under a
specific policy (Linder and Peters 1989; Varone and Landry 1997). This
observation is even more applicable when it comes to the question of
‘institutional design’ (Weimer 1995; Goodin 1996). In the case of institutional
resource regimes, the main question to be addressed is why various
instruments and institutional actor constellations have been selected or
omitted in water resource protection or use policies.
Political scientists working in an international context (international relations)
have been considering the issue of natural resources in the context of regime
research since the 1980's (e.g. Krasner 1983; Young 1994; Keohane and
Ostrom 1995; Young 1997; Underdal 1998) and have tended to concentrate
on global environmental commodities. Thus, in-depth analyses have already
been carried out for example on river management (Marty 1997). As part of
our study, we will be working with the tools of policy analysis and will try to
integrate the relevant theoretical elements from international regime theory
while concentrating on national regimes.
State of the art: Political guidance theory
Public steering capacity has been subject to critical scrutiny in political-
scientific research for some time now. The hierarchical guidance mechanisms
which characterised the actions of sovereign states would appear to be
increasingly failing - at least in the case of inexcessive emissions levels
(Scharpf 1993; Jänicke and Weidner 1997). Governments and authorities
have reacted to this by creating new instruments: negotiation solutions,
discursive processes, mediation, network solutions etc. are all gaining in
significance (c.f. e.g. Marin and Mayntz 1991; Scharpf 1993; Knoepfel 1995).
However, the actual use of these instruments is still based on an outdated
paradigm: limit values are defined for the emission of pollutants from specific
sources like industry, cars and agriculture. This paradigm leads to selective
intervention which only occurs when there is the danger of the limit value
being exceeded and is thus predominantly focused on individual cases. The
new direction in environmental policy arising from the sustainability debate
has seen this finely-tuned management of emissions replaced by the
paradigm of general steering of the acceptable levels of pollution for given
                                           
29 The authors thank Ingrid Kissling-Näf, Peter Knoepfel and Frédéric Varone for their
valuable input.
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spatial units defined in terms of ecosystems on different systemic levels (local,
regional, national, continental, global). The maximum global pollution levels
are then primarily conceived as a result of the use of certain quotas
(renewable and non-renewable) of identifiable natural resources (cf. WCED
1987; UNEP 1995:902ff.; Jäger et al. 1995; Knoepfel et al. 1997). As a result
of the global biodiversity and climate debates, a broad range of literature is
currently emerging on the concrete implications of this change of paradigm for
the management requirements of political-administrative instances (UNEP
1995). Specific examples of this include the discussion of resource use quotas
and the debate surrounding questions of the governance of sustainable
policies. The proposed project will deal with the governance of sustainable
public policies and will attempt to develop concepts for the management of
natural resources a stage further.
State of the art: Political and economic theory of institutions
The field of institutions theory is now very broad and includes approaches
such as the new economics of organisation, the property-rights approach and
transactions cost theory (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutional approaches can
now be found in most disciplines. In the context of resource research, the
property rights approach or regime research is worthy to mention particularly
(Bromley 1989, 1990, 1991; Burns 1996; Feeny et al. 1990; Schlager 1992;
Libecap 1993; Devlin and Grafton 1998), specifically the common-pool
resources theory (Ostrom 1990; 1992a; 1992b; 1994; 1997; Ostrom et al.
1994; 1996). In our research, we will be linking up with the decades of
research in the area of property rights and will try to integrate ideas from
Scharpf's (1997) actor-centred institutionalism as well as the more recent
resource regimes research. According to Ostrom, regulative systems exercise
a decisive influence on the use of natural resources in that they determine
who has access to the resource and when and in what form it can be used.
Another integral part of the regulative system are mechanisms for the
alteration of rights of action, including the relevant monitoring.
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Appendix 2: Facts and assessments sheet for case studies
Title of case: XYZ
Rival uses & users at stake
- The case is analysed as a single / multiple case
- Rivalry 1: XYZ
- Rivalry 2: etc.
Main variable B. Regime changes
1. Extent changes
Key facts:
- XYZ
-
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
2. Internal coherence public governance changes
a. Levels and scales
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
b. Actors and networks
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
c. Perspectives and objectives
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
d. Strategies and instruments
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
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e. Responsibilities and resources for implementation
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
General assessment internal coherence public governance
Key facts:
- XYZ
-
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
3. Internal coherence property rights changes
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
4. External coherence between public governance and property rights
changes
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
General assessment regime change
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
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Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
Main variable C. Implications for sustainability
1. Natural resources & environment
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
2. Economic development consequences
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
3. Social development consequences
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
General assessment implications for sustainability
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
Main variable A. Change agents and conditions
1. Change agents
a. National regime changes
EU policies originated:
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
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Other:
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
b. Problem pressure
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
c. Other
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
General assessment of force of change agents
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
2. Conditions
a. Tradition
- Ideology:
- Examples:
- Respect and trust:
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
b. Joint problem
- Knowledge bases:
- Information symmetry:
- Responsibility for the future:
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
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c. Joint change
- Knowledge bases:
- Information symmetry:
- Respect for others actors interests:
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
d. Credible alternative threat
- Dominant actor:
- Information on alternative options for dominant actor:
- Negative effects of option for other actors:
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
e. Institutional interfaces
- Clarity of responsibilities:
- Alert mass media:
- Protection of agreements:
- Brokers:
- Small n, or good representatives of stakeholders:
- Legal path for integration:
- Stimulating policy guidelines:
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
General assessment of conditions
Key facts:
- XYZ
- 
Scoring:
0 1 2 3 4
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Appendix 3: Table of assessments
Table here
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Appendix 4: Ecological sustainability and the EU Water
Framework Directive
Introduction
The Euwareness project is considering rival uses of water resources and the
way in which regimes try to balance these rival uses in a sustainable way. The
question then is: what do me mean by sustainable water use? Since this
project aims to contribute to the implementation of the EU-WFD, we prefer to
stay close to the way in which a sustainable status of water resources (water
bodies, water basins) in the EU-WFD has been defined. Key aims of this
directive are the following:
- expanding the scope of water protection to all waters, surface waters and
groundwater;
- achieving ‘good status’ for all waters by a set deadline;
- water management based on river basins;
- ‘combined approach’ of emission limit values and quality standards;
- getting the prices right;
- getting the citizen involved more closely;
- streamlining legislation.
Looking at these aims, we could make a first distinction between criteria for
ecological sustainability, for social sustainability and for sustainable
management. In this appendix we will elaborate on ecological sustainability.
Ecological sustainability refers to achieving a ‘good status’ for all
waters by a set deadline. It is addressing the status of water quality and water
quantity in terms of its availability and good shape for present and future
demands (uses). There are many EU Directives setting standards for such a
good status. The EU-WFD aims to integrate these standards. Ecological
sustainability especially aims to protect the way in which water resources are
needed for the ecosystem (ecological uses) or for human health (like the
Drinking Water Directive).
Ecological sustainability depends on social sustainability and
sustainable management as preconditions. In the Euwareness project we are
especially interested in the interaction between property rights and public
policy and how this interaction could contribute to more ecological
sustainability. We will look at institutional arrangements or regimes that have
been developed through the years to manage conflicting water uses and to
guide these uses in a sustainable way. Part of the regimes is that they do
establish property rights and use rights towards water resources, in order to
clarify the ownership, but also to restrict the owner’s water use by allowing
others to make use of the same water resources. The possession of titles, the
exclusion of uses, and the access of users are organised by this. Another part
of the regime is that supplementary policies are formulated to help these
property and use rights work in the targeted directions.
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Ecological sustainability
Water use
In the Euwareness project we are focusing on rival uses of water resources
and on improving the sustainability of water use. The EU-WFD is defining the
use of water as:
- abstraction, distribution and consumption of surface water or groundwater;
- emission of pollutants into surface water and waste water collection and
treatment facilities which subsequently discharge into surface water;
- any other application of surface water or groundwater having the potential
of a significant impact on the status of water.
On the basis of this general distinction we created a list of more specific uses.
Water resources: water bodies and river basins
Water appears in nature as part of a natural entity. In the Euwareness project
we call such an entity a water resource. This could be a body of water. The
EU-WFD defines a water body as a discrete and homogeneous element of
surface water or groundwater such as an aquifer, a lake, a reservoir, a stretch
of stream, river or canal, an estuary or a stretch of coastal water. The status of
water refers to the status of a body of water.
Due to the interconnection between water and land, a water resource could
also be a river basin. According to the EU-WFD a river basin means the area
of land from which all surface water run-off flows through a sequence of
streams, rivers and, possibly, lakes into the sea at a single river mouth,
estuary or delta. The EU-WFD also distinguishes sub-basins. A sub-basin
means the area of land from which all surface run-off flows through a series of
streams, rivers, and, possibly, lakes to a particular point in a water course
(normally a lake or a river confluence). In our project we will be considering
sub-basins as unit of analysis for the case studies.
Good status criteria
The EU-WFD is focusing on the good status of water, while addressing both
quality and quantity aspects of water resources. There are a number of
objectives in respect of which the quality of water is protected. The key ones
at European level are general protection of the aquatic ecology, specific
protection of unique and valuable habitats, protection of drinking water
resources, and protection of bathing water. All these objectives must be
integrated for each river basin. It is clear that the last three – special habitats,
drinking water areas and bathing water – apply only to specific bodies of water
(those supporting special wetlands; those identified for drinking water
abstraction; those generally used as bathing areas). In contrast, ecological
protection should apply to all waters: the central requirement of the Treaty is
that the environment be protected to a high level in its entirety. For this
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reason, a general requirement for ecological protection, and a general
minimum chemical standard, was introduced to cover all surface waters.
These are the two elements "good ecological status" and "good chemical
status".
I. Surface water: ecological protection
Good ecological status is defined in terms of the quality of the biological
community, the hydrological characteristics and the chemical characteristics.
As no absolute standards for biological quality can be set which apply across
the Community, because of ecological variability, the controls are specified as
allowing only a slight departure from the biological community which would be
expected in conditions of minimal anthropogenic impact. A set of procedures
for identifying that point for a given body of water, and establishing particular
chemical or hydromorphological standards to achieve it, is provided, together
with a system for ensuring that each Member State interprets the procedure in
a consistent way (to ensure comparability). The system is somewhat
complicated, but this is inevitable given the extent of ecological variability, and
the large number of parameters, which must be dealt with.
II. Surface water: chemical protection
Good chemical status is defined in terms of compliance with all the quality
standards established for chemical substances at European level. The
Directive also provides a mechanism for renewing these standards and
establishing new ones by means of a prioritisation mechanism for hazardous
chemicals. This will ensure at least a minimum chemical quality, particularly in
relation to very toxic substances, everywhere in the Community.
III. Surface water: other uses
As mentioned above, the other uses or objectives for which water is protected
apply in specific areas, not everywhere. Therefore, the obvious way to
incorporate them is to designate specific protection zones within the river
basin which must meet these different objectives. The overall plan of
objectives for the river basin will then require ecological and chemical
protection everywhere as a minimum, but where more stringent requirements
are needed for particular uses, zones will be established and higher objectives
set within them.
There is one other category of uses which does not fit into this picture. It is the
set of uses which adversely affect the status of water but which are
considered essential on their own terms – they are overriding policy
objectives. The key examples are flood protection and essential drinking water
supply, and the problem is dealt with by providing derogations from the
requirement to achieve good status for these cases, so long as all appropriate
mitigation measures are taken. Less clear-cut cases are navigation and power
generation, where the activity is open to alternative approaches (transport can
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be switched to land, other means of power generation can be used).
Derogations are provided for those cases also, but subject to three tests: that
the alternatives are technically impossible, that they are prohibitively
expensive, or that they produce a worse overall environmental result.
IV. Groundwater: chemical status
The case of groundwater is somewhat different. The presumption in relation to
groundwater should broadly be that it should not be polluted at all. For this
reason, setting chemical quality standards may not be the best approach, as it
gives the impression of an allowed level of pollution to which Member States
can fill up. A very few such standards have been established at European
level for particular issues (nitrates, pesticides and biocides), and these must
always be adhered to. But for general protection, we have taken another
approach. It is essentially a precautionary one. It comprises a prohibition on
direct discharges to groundwater, and (to cover indirect discharges) a
requirement to monitor groundwater bodies so as to detect changes in
chemical composition and to reverse any anthropogenically induced upward
pollution trend. Taken together, these should ensure the protection of
groundwater from all contamination, according to the principle of minimum
anthropogenic impact.
V. Groundwater: quantitative status
Quantity is also a major issue for groundwater. Briefly, the issue can be put as
follows. There is only a certain amount of recharge into a groundwater each
year, and of this recharge, some is needed to support connected ecosystems
(whether they be surface water bodies, or terrestrial systems such as
wetlands). For good management, only that portion of the overall recharge not
needed by the ecology can be abstracted – this is the sustainable resource,
and the Directive limits abstraction to that quantity.
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